Essays on Strategy, Institutions, and Multinationals in Global Supply Chains by Carlsson, Kjell
 Essays on Strategy, Institutions, and Multinationals in Global
Supply Chains
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Carlsson, Kjell.  2012.  Essays on Strategy, Institutions, andMultinationals in Global Supply Chains.  Doctoral dissertation,
Harvard University.
Accessed April 17, 2018 3:30:39 PM EDT
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9385641
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
 ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2012 – Kjell Ke-Li Carlsson 
All rights reserved.
            
Dissertation Advisor: Juan Alcácer                                                      Kjell Ke-Li Carlsson 
iii 
 
 
Essays on Strategy, Institutions, and Multinationals  
in Global Supply Chains 
 
Abstract 
This dissertation investigates two major themes: (1) the strategies that global 
firms use to overcome weak institutions in their outsourcing and (2) how local 
institutions affected how firms reconfigured their global supply chains in response to the 
financial crisis. All three papers use a unique dataset of international contract 
manufacturing orders that provides hitherto unavailable insight into the global supply 
chains of many of the world’s largest brands in footwear, sportswear, and apparel.  
In the first essay I create a formal model that examines the use of relational 
contracting by firms to overcome weak contracting institutions in their supply chains. 
The model predicts that, when the risk of future demand shocks is high, buyers make 
long-term commitments to source from suppliers in weak institution countries. I test this 
model and find that buyers preserved their relationships with suppliers in weak contract 
enforcement countries during the financial crisis for reasons that cannot be explained by 
cost. In conjunction with the model, these results suggest that relying on relational 
contracting to overcome weak contracting institutions can reduce a buyer’s flexibility in 
configuring his supplier networks. 
In the second essay, I examine whether firms choose to source from multinational 
(MNC) suppliers instead of local suppliers as a means of overcoming weak contract 
enforcement institutions or as a means of accessing supply chain management 
capabilities. I find strong evidence that buyers are more likely to source from MNC 
suppliers in countries where contract enforcement is weak and when they have less 
 iv 
 
experience sourcing from a given country. Buyers are also more likely to source from 
MNC suppliers when they source a wider variety of products, have smaller supplier 
networks, and have smaller order volumes. 
My third essay investigates how trade credit terms are affected by local credit 
markets, financial institutions, and market power. I find that trade credit terms are longer 
when local credit markets are more developed and when buyers have market power. I 
also test how trade credit terms responded to the financial crisis and find that terms 
lengthened subject to the depth of local credit markets and buyer market power. 
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The Hidden Costs of Using Relational Contracting to Overcome 
Weak Contracting Institutions: Evidence from Global Supplier 
Networks during the Financial Crisis  
1.1 Introduction 
The relational contracting literature has long noted that private contract 
enforcement mechanisms – such as developing trust, or relying on the value of the 
relationship in the future to ensure agreement – can be used as a substitute for formal 
contracting, and can allow for greater flexibility in responding to events that cannot be 
foreseen ex-ante (Macaulay 1963, Macneil 1978, Klein & Leffler 1981). The 
international business literature has further validated that firms do rely more on private 
enforcement when formal contract enforcement institutions are weak (Johnson, McMillan 
and Woodruff 2002, Antras and Foley 2011). However, this chapter argues that when 
firms source from suppliers in multiple different contracting environments, and rely on 
relational contracting – a type of private enforcement – to overcome the negative effects 
of weak contracting institutions, they decrease their ability to optimally reconfigure their 
supplier networks in response to fluctuations in demand. Using a formal model of multi-
country sourcing, I find that, when fluctuations in demand are high, buyers make long 
term commitments to use suppliers in weak institution countries, and use suppliers in 
strong countries only when demand is high. In doing so buyers may end up terminating 
relationships with suppliers that charge lower prices and be unable to take advantage of 
new, lower priced, sourcing opportunities. The model is the first formal model of 
relational contracting in the context of multi-country sourcing, and one of few models of 
relational contracting that incorporate shocks. I test the results of this model using a 
confidential dataset of contract manufacturing orders that is unique in terms of the 
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number of large global buyers and the breadth of countries represented, over many years. 
I use the recent financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to identify the tradeoffs 
buyers made by using relational contracting to overcome weak institutions. I find strong 
support that buyers were much more likely to stop ordering from suppliers in strong 
contract enforcement countries while continuing to order from suppliers in weak 
enforcement countries even when controlling for price and cost. Further, buyers mere 
much less willing to stop ordering from suppliers with whom they had long relationships.  
I interpret these results to signify that, by relying on relational contracting in 
countries with weak institutions, these buyers lessened their ability to reconfigure their 
supply chains and take advantage of the reduced demand to lower their costs. Further, in 
contrast to the literature that suggests that local firms benefit from stronger institutions, 
these results suggest that suppliers in weak contract enforcement countries were protected 
by their country’s weak contracting institutions at the expense of suppliers in countries 
with stronger institutions. 
This chapter is divided into seven sections. In Section 1.2 I review the theoretical 
literature on private enforcement and formal contracting as well as the empirical literature 
on the use of private enforcement in different enforcement environments. I then create a 
model starting with a simple incomplete contracting model, extending it to an infinite 
horizon setting, introducing shocks to demand, adding multi-country sourcing, and, 
finally, introducing differences in cost between suppliers. I use this model to generate 
hypotheses about which suppliers would continue to receive orders, and which would not, 
after a shock to demand like the financial crisis. 
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In Section 1.3 I describe the empirical setting and the data, namely a unique 
dataset of the purchase orders of 28 large US buyers with their 668 suppliers in 56 
countries primarily in the footwear, apparel, and sportswear industries, worth $10.9bn, 
from 2007-2009. I present the results of the analysis in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 I 
conduct an extensive array of robustness checks. Finally, in Section 1.6, I discuss the 
results, their contributions and limitations, and directions for future research. 
1.2 Theoretical Development 
In this section I look at the prior literature on using private enforcement 
mechanisms in response to weak institutional environments. I draw on the literatures on 
the property rights view of the firm, transaction costs, relational contracting, and 
international business, and show that there are substantial tradeoffs to using private 
enforcement to mitigate the effect of weak institutional environments, that have gone 
unnoticed. I then create a model of multi-country sourcing starting with a simple 
incomplete contracting model, which I extend to an infinite horizon setting, adding 
shocks to demand, sourcing from two countries with different levels of contract 
enforcement, and differences in supplier costs. 
1.2.1 Literature Review 
A cornerstone of this investigation is the notion that contracts are either 
incomplete, i.e. it is not possible to write a binding contract that specifies all future 
contingencies, or are prohibitively costly to enforce, which in turn leads firms to use 
“private” mechanisms to enforce agreements. The most studied of these mechanisms is 
vertical integration going back to Coase (1937) and forming the basis for both transaction 
cost economics (Williamson 1979) and the property rights view of the firm literature 
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(Grossman and Hart 1986). In both of these streams of the literature, a buyer chooses to 
vertically integrate with its supplier in order to remove or mitigate the likelihood that the 
supplier will act opportunistically against the interests of the buyer or in order to elicit 
superior investment by the crucial party. Later work has extended this literature to look at 
how firms behave in different institutional contexts. Henisz and Williamson (1999) and 
Henisz (2000) found that foreign firms operating in an environment with a high risk of 
government expropriation were less likely to vertically integrate except in the presence of 
contractual hazards in which case they were more likely to vertically integrate. 
Expanding on the property rights view, Antras and Helpman (2004) explicitly equate 
incomplete contracting with complete contracting but with weak enforcement by contract 
enforcement institutions. In their model, firms vertically integrate in weak contract 
enforcement environments and outsource to third parties in strong environments. Yeaple 
(2006) tests this model and finds broad support for it. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) look at 
the ownership of export processing plants in China and find that factories tend to be 
owned by the foreign party when either large relationship specific investments must be 
made or when contracting costs are higher due to weak local enforcement. 
A limitation of this literature is that it does not account for the fact that an ever 
increasing number of firm activities, and in increasing volumes, are being outsourced to 
third parties abroad. Further, this outsourcing is growing particularly quickly in countries 
with weak contract enforcement institutions like China, Vietnam, and Indonesia. A likely 
explanation for this is that firms are relying on private enforcement mechanisms other 
that vertical integration to deter opportunistic behavior by their suppliers.  
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Many alternative private enforcement mechanisms are suggested by the relational 
contracting literature, going back to Macaulay (1963). This literature suggests that firms 
can enforce agreements while remaining non-integrated, and thus both avoid the potential 
negative incentive effects that can result from vertical integration and gain greater 
flexibility than with formal contracting, because firms can respond more efficiently to 
states of nature that would have been unforeseen in the past when a formal contract 
would have been signed. The mechanisms suggested by this literature roughly divide into 
two categories – those that look at the history of the parties working together, and those 
that look at the expected benefit of the parties working together in the future. Much of the 
work in the former category looks at the “trust” that develops between parties that makes 
it less likely that either party will act opportunistically (Granovetter 1985, Gulati 1995, 
Zaheer et al 1998, Poppo and Zenger 2002). The work in the latter category notes that the 
loss of a (discounted) future premium rent stream that results from parties working 
together, the “shadow of the future”, prevents the parties from acting opportunistically 
(Klein and Leffler 1981, Axelrod 1984, Baker et al. 2002). Recent work by Poppo et al. 
(2008) has tried to unify these categories and has found that prior relationship history 
lessens the likelihood that a party will act opportunistically mainly by increasing the 
parties’ expectations that they will work with each other in the future. 
A few papers have tried to measure the strength of relational contracting in 
different institutional contexts and they have largely focused on using trade credit as a 
measurement of relationship strength. Johnson et al. (2002) look at four transition 
countries and find that firms rely more on relational mechanisms when courts are weak 
and that firms are more willing to extend credit to suppliers when they have longer 
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relationships. Antras and Foley (2011) extend this work further, developing a model that 
predicts that trade credit will be extended more when contracting institutions are strong 
and parties have had longer relationships with each other, and testing it using the 
international sales data of a major poultry producer. 
While a broad literature has found that institutions have large impacts on firms 
that rely on them (La Porta et al. 1997, Khanna and Palepu 2000, Johnson et al. 2002), 
much of the literature on relational contracting implies that it can be used either to 
mitigate the negative effects of weak institutions or be used as a complement to strong 
institutions. Unlike this literature, which has emphasized the advantages of using 
relational contracting to overcome weak institutions, the disadvantages from using 
relational contracting have been largely overlooked. 
Since using relational contracting involves the threat of the loss of future business, 
and, according to Poppo et al (2008), building expectations about the value of that future 
business over time, buyers can be restricted in their actions when those actions diminish 
the value of that future business, when relational contracting is important. For example, a 
buyer that only occasionally sources from a supplier will be less efficient at deterring 
opportunistic behavior (or need to pay a higher price to ensure compliance) than a buyer 
that sources the same amount regularly because the value of the first buyer’s future 
business is less. Similarly, if a buyer stops sourcing from a supplier during a temporary 
drop in demand, it informs that supplier’s expectations of business from that buyer during 
future crises. The supplier can expect that it will not receive business during future crises 
and will thus value that buyer’s future business less than if the buyer had continued to 
source from him throughout (and may require a higher payment for compliance in the 
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future). Consequently, if the buyer wants to enforce agreements using relational 
contracting in the future, he may find it necessary to continue sourcing from the supplier 
during a drop in demand even though it is costly in the short run. The options for a buyer 
that only sources locally may be limited to incurring excess inventory and debt. However, 
a buyer that sources from several countries with different levels of contract enforcement 
has the option of reducing orders from suppliers in countries where he does not need to 
rely on relational contracting, and shifting orders to the suppliers in countries where he 
does. Even when this incurs costs, it is likely to be less expensive than incurring excess 
inventory, particularly in industries where preferences change rapidly. Thus, using 
relational contracting to overcome weak institutions can have a substantial impact on how 
a buyer conducts international sourcing, particularly when economic conditions fluctuate. 
1.2.2 Introduction to the Model 
I create a formal model to investigate exactly the way in which relational 
contracting and economic fluctuations affect multi-country sourcing decisions. The 
foundation of the model is an incomplete contracting model (based on the toy model 
described in Che Hausch 1999) that includes the strength of contract enforcement in the 
country where the supplier operates. Like Antras and Helpman (2004), I note the parallels 
between a situation where parties can not write a complete contract because of the nature 
of the transaction or uncertainty, and a situation where parties can write a complete 
contract, but can not get it enforced because of weak contract enforcement institutions. 
The basic incomplete contracting model demonstrates that buyers are able to elicit 
greater effort and pay lower prices in countries with strong institutions, when they 
interact on a one-time basis. I then extend this model to an infinite-horizon setting and 
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find that buyers are able to elicit the same effort (albeit at a higher price) from suppliers 
in countries with weak institutions if the suppliers’ discounted future return from 
complying with the agreement exceeds its returns from reneging. I then introduce a risk 
of negative shocks in every period and find that, if the likelihood of future shocks is 
sufficiently high, relational contracting becomes ineffective. Next, I examine a multi-
country scenario where capacity constraints require the buyer to source from suppliers in 
separate institutional environments and determine the conditions under which it is 
optimal for the buyer to commit to always sourcing from the supplier in an institutional 
environment that does not enforce contracts. Crucially, I identify a threshold value for the 
risk of negative shocks. Below this value, it is optimal for a buyer to always source from 
the cheaper supplier in a country that does enforce contracts. Above this value, the buyer 
is better off committing to source from the more expensive supplier in the country that 
does not enforce contracts, in every period. Finally, I introduce differences in efficiency 
(i.e. cost) between the suppliers. 
1.2.3 Foundation of the Model 
Assume a buyer B wants to source one unit of a good from a supplier S to sell to a 
final customer, for a return v(e).1 Further, assume that the value to the final customer, 
v(e)2, is a function of the effort e that the supplier spends on producing the good, and, for 
simplicity, that there are no other costs of production. The additional value from greater 
effort could be due to the product arriving in a timely manner before a shopping season or 
                                                 
1 I assume that, due to intellectual property rights protection in the market that B serves, 
that the suppliers can not sell their good directly to the end customer. 
2 I further assume that this value function has typical properties, i.e. that it is continuously 
differentiable, strictly concave, and bounded. Also v(0)=0 and v’(0)>1.  
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a higher quality that the end consumer is willing to pay more for. Further, I assume that 
there are many suppliers and thus B can make a take it or leave it offer to S that indicates 
the level of effort e the supplier will expend and the price p that B will pay S for the good. 
Initially, I assume that all suppliers have the same cost of providing effort. I relax this 
assumption in Section 1.2.9.  
Since B chooses e and p to maximize his surplus, he chooses p=p* such that S is 
just indifferent between producing and not producing the good, i.e. p=e and chooses e= 
e* to maximize his surplus (v(e)-p)= (v(e)-e). From the first order condition we can 
determine e* such that v’(e*)=1 and p*=e*. The buyer’s total surplus is thus v(e*)- e* 
while the supplier has zero surplus. 
If e is not contractible, e.g. because the characteristics that are valuable to the 
final customer are not known at the time the agreement is made, then the level of e will 
not be specified in the contract and will be chosen by S to maximize his surplus. Since S 
can choose any level of e, for any price p that B offers, S will choose e=0. A better 
alternative for B in this scenario is to bargain with the supplier over the surplus ex-post, 
i.e. B is better off not offering any price but to agree to negotiate with S once the good 
has been produced. In keeping with the organizational economics literature, I assume that 
the parties negotiate over the ex-post division of surplus using Nash bargaining,3 i.e. each 
party receives his outside option plus half of the surplus that is generated by the parties 
working together. Consequently S knows that, once he has expended effort e and the 
good is produced, he will get half of the surplus generated from selling the good to B 
                                                 
3 For us, the necessary feature of Nash bargaining is that the supplier gains a fraction of 
the incremental surplus caused by his additional effort. Consequently, a wide range of 
alternative bargaining solutions can be used in this analysis with similar results.  
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during the ex post bargaining, i.e. ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ  since S does not have any alternative buyers (and 
thus has no outside option).4 S will therefore get a total surplus of ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ െ ݁ and chooses 
ൌ ݁௅ , the second best level of effort, to maximize this surplus. From the first order 
condition we find ݁௅ is defined by ݒᇱሺ݁௅ሻ ൌ 2, and thus we see that, with incomplete 
contracting, the chosen level of effort is less than in the first best since ݁௅ ൏ ݁∗. The 
payoff to B, ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ  is also substantially less. 
1.2.4 Variable Contract Enforcement 
Now, instead of assuming that e can not be included in the contract because it is 
not known when the contract is written, assume that e is known but that the institutions 
that enforce contracts vary in the country where S is located. In this context B and S can 
write a contract, ex ante, in which they specify e and a price p that B will pay S for the 
good. If either party breaks the contract, i.e. if S does not expend effort e or is unwilling 
to sell the good at price p, or if B is unwilling to pay p, then the reneging party pays a fine 
ߙ to a third party enforcer. ߙ thus measures the strength of local contract enforcement 
and is high in high contract enforcement countries and low in countries with weak 
enforcement. If either party reneges on the contract then that party pays the fine and the 
parties bargain ex-post. If B reneges, then his payoff is ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ െ ߙ, while if S reneges then 
his payoff is ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ െ ݁ െ ߙ, which is maximized when ݁ ൌ ݁௅ as in the second best. Thus 
to prevent S from reneging, B would choose the lowest price p, such that S is indifferent 
                                                 
4 Even with multiple buyers we assume that intellectual property protection in the country 
where the final consumer resides makes it impossible for S to sell the good to anyone but 
B. 
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between the total surplus he gets when complying and reneging, i.e. p such that ݌ െ ݁ ൌ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ െ ߙ. Since, B would like to maximize ݒሺ݁ሻ െ ݌ ൌ ݒሺ݁ሻ െ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ െ ߙ ൅ ݁ቁ, 
B would like to choose ݁ ൌ ݁∗ as this maximizes his payoff.  
However, in order for this offer to be credible, it must also be the case that B does 
not have an incentive to renege, i.e. the price offered must not be greater than what he 
would pay under ex post renegotiation, ݌ ൑ ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ ൅ ߙ. Combined, this gives us the 
constraint that: 
ݒሺ݁ሻ
2 ൅ ߙ ൒
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ െ ߙ ൅ ݁ 
ߙ ൒
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ െ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ሻ
ଶ െ ݁ቁ
2  
Since S’s payoff is maximized when ݁ ൌ ݁௅, we know ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ െ ݁ ൑
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅. Thus 
without any external contract enforcement, ߙ ൌ 0, it is impossible to sustain any level of 
effort other than the second best. At any level of enforcement greater than zero, a level of 
effort ݁ ൐ ݁௅ is sustainable and will be chosen by the buyer up to ݁ ൌ ݁∗. Additional 
enforcement does not increase sustainable effort beyond ߙത ൌ
ೡሺ೐ಽሻ
మ ି௘ಽିቀ
ೡሺ೐∗ሻ
మ ି௘∗ቁ
ଶ . B’s 
payoff varies from ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ  to ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ െ ߙത ൅ ݁∗ቁ. 
This result implies that a buyer will, all else equal, always prefer to source from a 
supplier in a strong enforcement country over one in a weak enforcement country as he is 
able to obtain a lower price and higher effort. However, the buyer is indifferent between 
sourcing from suppliers in countries whose level of enforcement is above some threshold 
value. 
   12
The result that the price a buyer must pay when sourcing from a strong 
enforcement country is lower than the price when sourcing from a weak enforcement 
country is counterintuitive because, especially in international contract manufacturing 
firms usually outsource from countries with strong institutions to countries with weak 
institutions in order to lower their costs. In this model, the price that the buyer must pay 
has two components. The first component compensates the supplier for the cost of 
production, while the second component is a payoff that reduces the supplier’s incentive 
to exploit the weak contracting institutions and renege. In this model I have not hitherto 
assumed that the cost of production varies between institutional environments and thus 
the first component of price does not vary.  In contrast the second component varies 
inversely with the strength of local enforcement. In the real world we expect the cost of 
production to vary substantially across countries and suppliers. Thus, the increase in the 
price of sourcing a good from a country with weak institutions, may be offset by cheaper 
costs of manufacturing in that country. I introduce differences in costs between suppliers 
in different contract enforcement countries in Section 1.2.9.  
1.2.5 Relational Contracting 
Now assume that there is only one country to source from, Weak, and assume that 
this country does not enforce contracts at all, i.e. ߙ ൌ 0.5 The relational contracting 
literature (Klein and Leffler 1981, Axelrod 1984), notes that when parties work together 
repeatedly, a party may be coerced into complying because, if they renege, they will lose 
                                                 
5 For further analysis of the effect on the model of an intermediate level of contract 
enforcement please see Appendix 4.1 
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a future premium rent stream that comes from working together in the future. This, 
“shadow of the future” ensures that the parties comply with the agreement.  
In our context, assume that B needs a unit of good S in every period. If B promises 
to source one unit of the good S in every period, S will not renege if its payoff when 
reneging is less than the discounted infinite stream of future payments that it will get 
from B by complying. Since there are multiple identical suppliers B can credibly commit 
to never using S again if it reneges. Assuming that both B and S discount the future by the 
factor ߚ, S will not renege on a contract (p, e) as long as: 
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ ൑෍ߚ
௧ሺ݌ െ ݁ሻ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
݌ ൒ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቆݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅ቇ ൅ ݁ 
Since, as before, B has all the bargaining power, B will choose the lowest price p 
such that S does not have an incentive to renege, i.e. ݌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁. B’s 
total surplus per period is thus ݒሺ݁ሻ െ ݌ ൌ ݒሺ݁ሻ െ ݁ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ. B chooses e 
to maximize this surplus, and we see, from first order conditions that this occurs, as 
before when ݁ ൌ ݁∗. Since B would get a total surplus of ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ  per period without a 
relational contract, B would only choose relational contracting if ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൒
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ  which is true for all values of ߚ.  
The result is that, even when sourcing from a country with no contract 
enforcement, B can elicit first best effort from S by promising to source from S in the 
future, as long as S values the future sufficiently highly. The price that B must pay 
supplier S is, however, greater than sourcing from countries with strong enforcement.  
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1.2.6 Shocks 
Now assume that, in every period, there is a risk of an i.i.d. shock.6 When the 
shock occurs there is no longer any demand for the good in that period, and the 
probability that the shock will occur in any period is ߛ. In periods where B sources from S, 
the sum of S’s expected discounted future payment stream, if he does not renege, 
becomes:  
∑ ߚ௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ݌ െ ݁ሻஶ௧ୀ଴   
i.e. S will not renege as long as  
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ ൑
ଵିఊ
ଵିఉ ሺ݌ െ ݁ሻ  which is equivalent to 
݌ ൒ ሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఊሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁	  
Again, since B has all the bargaining power, he chooses ݌ ൌ ሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఊሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅
݁, and requires the supplier to expend effort ݁ ൌ ݁∗. However, the price p required to 
ensure this level of effort is ଵሺଵିఊሻ times higher than if there were no shocks. Consequently, 
the greater the likelihood of shocks, the higher the price the buyer must pay to ensure 
compliance. Importantly, the price may rise to the extent that it is inefficient to pay for 
compliance. B, will only choose compliance as long as the surplus he gets surpasses the 
surplus he gets when S reneges, i.e. ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݌ ൒ ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ . Consequently it must hold that: 
ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 ൒
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ
ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቆ
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ቇ ൅ ݁
∗ 
                                                 
6 Independent and identically distributed, i.e. each shock has the same probability 
distribution and is statistically independent of all other shocks. 
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ߛ ൑ ቌ1 െ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ
ቀݒሺ݁∗ሻെ݁∗ െ ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ ቁ
ቍ			ሼ1ሽ 
Consequently, there exists a value	̅ߛ ൌ ൭1 െ ሺଵିఉሻ൬
ೡ൫೐ಽ൯
మ ି௘ಽ൰
൬௩ሺ௘∗ሻି௘∗ିೡ൫೐ಽ൯మ ൰
൱	 where 0 ൑ ̅ߛ ൏ 1 
for which it is impossible for B to pay S enough to deter S from reneging. That is, with a 
sufficiently large risk of crises, it is not possible to use the shadow of the future to ensure 
first best effort. If ߛ ൑ ̅ߛ, B can deter reneging and gets a surplus of ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ
ሺଵିఉሻ
ሺଵିఊሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ. If ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ, then B can not deter reneging and gets 
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ  from ex-post 
bargaining. 
1.2.7 Multi-country Sourcing 
Now assume that there are two countries that B can source from. In one country, 
Weak, contracts are not enforced and there is no fine from reneging on a contract, i.e. 
ߙ ൌ 0. In the other country, Strong, contracts are easy to enforce and the fine for 
reneging on the contract is sufficiently large such that no supplier in Strong ever reneges. 
Further, there are capacity constraints such that only one unit of the good can be 
produced in each country and B needs two units of the good per period. Even though only 
one unit of the good can be produced in each country, there are multiple suppliers in each 
country that B can turn to.7  
In this scenario, B can write a contract with a supplier in Strong, ܵ௦ to get first 
best effort e* at a price ݌ ൌ ݁∗, and B will have a total surplus of ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗. To source 
from the supplier in Weak, ܵௐ, B can either accept second best effort ݁ ൌ ݁௅ and get a 
                                                 
7 Motivating example: All suppliers must hire from the same, limited labor pool. 
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surplus of ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ  or promise to source from that supplier in all future periods paying	݌ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁∗, getting ݁ ൌ ݁∗, and getting a surplus of ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ. Since	ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൐
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ  for all values of ߚ, 
it is optimal for B to promise to source from the supplier in Weak in all future periods.  
Now assume that a shock occurs such that B now only needs one unit of good in 
the current period. Furthermore, in all future periods there is now a probability ߛ, that the 
shock will reoccur reducing B’s need to one unit of the good in that period. In all other 
periods B will still need two units. B now has to choose which supplier he will source 
from during the current crisis and how to ensure that he will maximize his surplus in 
future periods. There are two different scenarios, ߛ ൑ ̅ߛ and ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ, that determine his 
decision. 
Scenario 1: ઻ ൑ ઻ത 
In this case, B must choose whether to source from ௌܵ or ܵௐ during the crisis. If B 
chooses ௌܵ, he pays ݌ ൌ ݁∗ and gets surplus ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ in the current period. However, 
in the next period in which there is no crisis, B must source from ܵௐ as well and must 
offer price ݌ ൌ ሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఊሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁∗, to deter him from reneging. B’s discounted future 
payoff is thus:  
෍ߚ௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ ൅෍ߚ௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻ൭ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቆ
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ቇ൱
ஶ
௧ୀଵ
		ሼ2ሽ 
On the other hand B could choose to always source from the supplier in Weak, 
paying ݌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁∗ in every period, and also sourcing from the 
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supplier in Strong in periods where there is no shock for price ݌ ൌ ݁∗. Using this strategy, 
B’s discounted future payoff is: 
∑ ߚ௧ ൬ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ൰ஶ௧ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௧ஶ௧ୀଵ ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ		ሼ3ሽ  
However this payoff is unambiguously less. Subtracting {3} from {2} we get: 
ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅ሻ 
The result is unambiguously positive. Consequently when ߛ ൑ ̅ߛ, i.e. the risk of 
future shocks is sufficiently small, B chooses to always use the supplier in Strong and 
employ the supplier in Weak only when there is no crisis. 
Scenario 2: ઻ ൐ ઻ത 
In this scenario, if B sources from ௌܵ during the crisis, then, in the next period 
when there is no crisis, there is no price p that B can offer ܵௐ to deter the supplier from 
reneging. (See Appendix 4.2 for an analysis of an alternate payment scheme in which B 
pays ܵௐ both when sourcing and when not sourcing from ܵௐ.) Consequently, B will get 
ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ in all periods and an additional ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ  in periods when there is no crisis. B’s 
discounted future payoff will thus be: 
෍ߚ௧
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ ൅෍ߚ௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻ ݒሺ݁௅ሻ2
ஶ
௧ୀଵ
				ሼ4ሽ 
In contrast, if B sources from ܵௐ during the crisis, and promises to keep sourcing 
from ܵௐ, and only sources from ௌܵ during periods when there is no crisis, B’s payoff 
remains the same as in {3}, ∑ ߚ௧ ൬ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ቁ൰ஶ௧ୀ଴ ൅ ∑ ߚ௧ஶ௧ୀଵ ሺ1 െ
ߛሻሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ 
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Subtracting {4} from {3} gives us  ఉሺଵିఊሻଵିఉ ቀݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ ቁ െ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ 
which is large for large values of ߚ, i.e. patient buyers and suppliers. It is also large when 
the value, to the buyer of first best effort ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ is large relative to the value of 
second best effort ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ ቁ. Consequently, when the likelihood that future demand will be 
depressed in the future is large, when additional effort is valuable, and when the parties 
are patient, it is optimal for B to source from ܵௐ on an ongoing basis and only source 
from ௌܵ when demand is high, even though it is more costly to source from ܵௐ than ௌܵ.  
1.2.8 Sourcing from Multiple Institutional Environments 
With these two scenarios we can derive several conclusions about how firms use 
relational contracting when sourcing from different countries with different levels of 
contract enforcement. It also provides us with predictions as to how we would expect 
buyers to behave in response to economic fluctuations. In scenario 1, we saw that, when 
the risk of future crises is small, it is optimal for the buyer to always source from the 
supplier in the strong enforcement country and to only source from the supplier in the 
weak enforcement country when demand is high enough.  
In this scenario, the supplier in Weak still provides first best effort because the 
price it receives in future periods, when there is no crisis, is high enough that it deters 
reneging, i.e. the weak institutions are overcome solely through relational contracting. 
This scenario also allows for substantial flexibility because the buyer can also stop 
ordering from the supplier in the strong enforcement country should a new, cheaper 
alternative present itself, without affecting the incentives to renege for any of the 
suppliers. If we were in scenario 1 – when looking at a snapshot of sourcing data at the 
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moment a crisis happened – we would see the buyer stop sourcing from the supplier in 
the weak institution country and, equivalently, stop sourcing from his most expensive 
supplier. We would also see buyers start sourcing from new, cheaper, suppliers. 
In contrast, in scenario 2, we see that when the risk of crises is high, the buyer 
does better by committing to source from the supplier in the weak enforcement country at 
all times, and only sources from the supplier in the strong enforcement country when 
demand exceeds the capacity of the weak enforcement supplier. By making this 
commitment, the value of future business to the supplier in Weak becomes sufficiently 
high that he loses the incentive to renege and supplies greater effort. However, though the 
buyer is able to use relational contracting to overcome weak institutions, he has 
substantially less flexibility than in scenario 1. Any reduction in orders to the supplier in 
weak, or likelihood of future reductions, reduces the future value of the relationship and 
increases the price the buyer must pay in order to ensure the supplier provides a high 
level of effort. If the future value of the relationship is reduced too much, relational 
contracting breaks down and the buyer can only get second best effort from this supplier. 
Consequently, the buyer is more restricted in his ability to take advantage of 
opportunities to source from other cheaper suppliers, especially during a crisis when such 
suppliers are particularly likely to be available. If we were in this scenario, at the time a 
crisis occurred we would see buyers continuing to source from their suppliers in weak 
enforcement countries and stop sourcing from their suppliers in strong enforcement 
countries. Equivalently, we would see them continue sourcing from their higher priced 
suppliers over their cheaper ones. Further, buyers would be less likely to source from new 
low-cost suppliers. 
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Hypothesis 1: When, during a crisis, buyers stop sourcing from their suppliers in 
strong institution countries and continue sourcing from their suppliers in weak institution 
countries, we are in scenario 2, implying that relational contracting is reducing buyer 
flexibility. 
1.2.9 Supplier Cost/Efficiency Differences 
So far in this analysis I have assumed that all suppliers have the same costs, i.e. it 
costs all of them the same effort e to generate value v(e) for the buyer. In the context of 
global supplier networks, this is unrealistic as costs typically vary across firms and 
locations. In this section I investigate how my results change when I introduce 
differences in efficiency – or, equivalently, cost – between the suppliers.  
Let us assume that there are two suppliers, an inefficient supplier that, as before, 
expends effort e to generate value v(e) to the buyer B, and an efficient supplier that can 
create value v(e) using a fraction of the effort of the inefficient supplier, i.e. ௘ఏ where 
ߠ ൐ 1. In the context of my model, there are now two cases to consider. In the first case 
the efficient supplier is in Weak while the inefficient supplier is in Strong. I consider the 
alternate case, where the inefficient supplier is in Weak while the efficient supplier is in 
Strong in Appendix 4.3.  
The case where the efficient supplier is in Weak (ܵௐ௘ ሻ and the inefficient supplier 
is in Strong ( ௌܵ௜), corresponds more closely with scenarios in global outsourcing, where 
costs are typically lower in countries with weak contract enforcement institutions. This 
case is substantially different from the original analysis because the optimal, second-best, 
effort supplied by ܵௐ௘  changes. Now that he is more efficient, his payoff, when he reneges, 
is ௩ሺ௘ሻଶ െ
௘
ఏ and thus he would chose ݁ ൌ ݁ᇱ such that ݒ′ሺ݁′ሻ ൌ
ଶ
ఏ. Since ݒ′ሺ݁௅ሻ ൌ 2, in this 
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new scenario, the second best effort by the supplier in Weak increases, i.e. ݁ᇱ ൐ ݁௅, as 
does his payoff when reneging since  ݒሺ݁ᇱሻ ൐ ݒሺ݁௅ሻ . Consequently, the price demanded 
by this supplier in order for him not to renege changes. B again sets the price such that 
this supplier is indifferent between his expected future benefit of complying and reneging. 
In the case where ܵௐ௘  is just being used in times when there is no crisis, this price is set by 
the equation: 
෍ߚ௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
൬݌ െ ݁
∗
ߠ ൰ ൌ
ݒሺ݁′ሻ
2 െ
݁′
ߠ  
i.e.  
݌ ൌ ሺ1 െ ߚሻሺ1 െ ߛሻ ቆ
ݒሺ݁′ሻ
2 െ
݁′
ߠቇ ൅
݁∗
ߠ 			ሼ5ሽ 
However, as before, B and ܵௐ௘  will only agree to this price if B does not have an 
incentive to renege. Thus the price must be low enough that B’s return if he does not 
renege is must be at least as large as when he does, i.e. 
ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݌ ൒ ݒሺ݁
ᇱሻ
2 			ሼ6ሽ 
Combining {6} with {5} we can again solve for ߛ:  
ߛ ൑ 1 െ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩൫௘ᇲ൯ଶ െ
௘ᇲ
ఏ ቁ
ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ௘∗ఏ െ
௩ሺ௘ᇲሻ
ଶ
			ሼ7ሽ 
Which gives us a new threshold value ߛ′ഥ ൌ 1 െ ሺଵିఉሻ൬
ೡ൫೐ᇲ൯
మ ି
೐ᇲ
ഇ൰
௩ሺ௘∗ሻି೐∗ഇି
ೡ൫೐ᇲ൯
మ
. When the risk of 
crisis is above this threshold level, there is no price p that B can credibly offer ܵௐ௘  in 
order to prevent Weak from reneging. Further, when we compare {7} to {1}, we see that 
this new threshold is lower than the threshold when both suppliers are equally efficient, 
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i.e. ߛ′ഥ ൏ ̅ߛ, and the difference is increasing in ߠ. In the previous section we saw that this 
threshold defines the ranges in which the supplier in Strong is always chosen and the 
supplier in Weak is only chosen when there isn’t a crisis, and the range in which B 
promises to always source from Weak and only uses the supplier in Strong when demand 
is high. Consequently, the greater the difference in costs and efficiency between the two 
suppliers, the greater the likelihood that B will make a long term promise to always 
source from the supplier in Weak, i.e. the greater the likelihood that we are in scenario 2 
above. In the context of my data I thus expect that when the difference in costs (wages, 
raw materials, etc.) is high between suppliers, then suppliers in countries with weak 
contract enforcement will be preserved at the expense of suppliers in countries with 
strong contract enforcement, or, equivalently, suppliers in high cost countries will be 
dropped during the crisis much more frequently than suppliers in low cost countries. 
Hypothesis 2: The larger the difference in costs between suppliers in weak and 
strong enforcement countries, the greater the likelihood that we are in scenario 2 and 
relational contracting reduces buyer flexibility in choosing who to source from. 
1.3 Empirical Design 
My model suggests that firms that source similar goods8 in countries with 
different contracting institutions – and rely on relational contracting in countries with 
weak institutions – find themselves unable to optimally reconfigure their supplier 
networks when faced with a crisis and a likelihood of crises in the future. In these 
                                                 
8 My model assumes that the suppliers a buyer is choosing between provide it with a 
similar value v(e) and that the way this value varies with effort is the same. If these 
conditions hold the suppliers could be providing entirely different goods. To ensure that 
my empirical results are robust to differences in products I try to control for product type 
in Section 1.5.3. 
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situations they must continue sourcing from weak institution countries in order to prevent 
these suppliers reneging on their agreements, at the expense of potentially cheaper 
suppliers in strong institution countries. Consequently, this drawback of using relational 
contracting will manifest itself when there is an unexpected shock that changes 
participants’ expectations of likelihood of current and future crises, and be most 
noticeable for buyers who source from suppliers in vastly different institutional 
environments.  
An important consideration in this analysis is the duration of a relationship 
between a buyer and a seller. A long prior relationship may be an indication of a long-
term implicit commitment by a buyer to a seller, have led to learning or other relationship 
specific investments that increase the value of the relationship to the buyer versus other 
relationships, or another form of private enforcement mechanism in which the parties 
develop a “trust” that makes reneging more emotionally costly and the relationship more 
valuable. 
To test for the drawback to using relational contracting in a multi-country setting I 
use a unique set of international contract manufacturing purchase orders during the time 
of the financial crisis and estimate the impact of contracting institutions and relationship 
history on the likelihood that a relationship between a buyer and a supplier, from a given 
country, in a given year, was terminated. 
1.3.1 Data 
International contract manufacturing is an excellent setting to study the 
interactions between relational contracting and formal contract enforcement, for several 
reasons. Firstly, there is significant variation in contract enforcement institutions across 
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countries – much more than we find within most countries. Secondly, in many industries, 
buyers do little or no in-house manufacturing allowing us to disregard the confounding 
decision of whether to manufacture in-house or outsource. Thirdly, the fact that each 
buyer typically transacts with multiple suppliers allows us to separate the characteristics 
of the buyer from the characteristics of the relationship. An additional benefit is the fact 
that buyers and, increasingly, suppliers can span multiple institutional environments and 
it is one of the few areas in which we can get accurate data on emerging market 
multinational firms. 
For my purposes, looking at this data before and during the financial crisis is 
particularly valuable because the financial crisis creates a quasi-natural experiment. The 
crisis was an exogenous shock that greatly affected the demand for the products offered 
by western buyers in many industries that, in turn, forced them to make choices about 
which suppliers to continue sourcing from. Buyers were forced to weigh the value of 
keeping relationships that were important for the future against the need for immediate 
cost savings. 
The problem, however, is that international contract manufacturing data, and 
outsourcing data more broadly, is scarce because it is typically confidential and needs to 
be acquired on a company-by-company basis. Consequently, most research that has been 
done has either looked at domestic outsourcing – for which there is little institutional 
variation – or the activities of multinationals abroad – which contains little information 
about their relationships with third parties. 
To overcome these difficulties I worked with a provider of cloud-based software 
that manages sourcing and provides financing services for many large global brands. 
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These firms typically manage all of their sourcing via this software, and all information 
about their purchase orders, from ordering through shipment, and then invoicing and 
payment is transmitted and processed by the software. The purchase orders used in this 
investigation contained data on the buyer, supplier, country of origin (i.e. country in 
which the goods were last processed), price per unit, date the order was generated and 
latest shipping date, payment terms and customs classification. 
In this chapter I analyze the purchase orders of 28 primarily US-based buyers 
with all of their 668 suppliers across 56 countries from 2007-2009. These buyers 
conducted $5.2bn in transactions with these suppliers in 2007 and reduced their orders to 
these suppliers to $2.3bn in 2009. The buyers were primarily in the apparel (12 
companies), sportswear (4), and footwear (3), industries, but there were also buyers in the 
toys (1), sporting goods (2), furniture (1), confectionary (1) and autoparts(1) industries.   
My analysis focuses on whether a buyer terminates or reduces orders from a 
supplier from a given country of origin. Consequently orders are aggregated to the buyer-
supplier-country level by year, i.e. how much a given buyer sourced from a given 
supplier in a given country per year from 2007 through 2009. (See Section 1.5.3 for an 
analysis with orders aggregated to the buyer-supplier-country-2 digit HTS code level.)  
1.3.2 Empirical Model 
I use logistic regression to examine the impact of the contract enforcement 
environment in the country of origin and the prior duration of the relationship, on the 
likelihood that the buyer terminated a given relationship with a given supplier for 
products manufactured in a given country of origin in a given year. Consequently, the 
model I estimate is: 
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ܶ݁ݎ݉݅݊ܽݐ݁݀஻ௌ௖௧
ൌ ݂ሺߚଵܥ௖௧ ൅ ߚଶܴ஻ௌ௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܳ஻ௌ௧ିଵ൅ߚସ ஻ܲௌ௖௧ିଵ ൅ ߞ஻ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߴ௣ ൅ ߝ஻ௌ௖௧ሻ 
Here, ܶ݁ݎ݉݅݊ܽݐ݁݀஻ௌ௖௧ is the dependent variable that indicates whether or not a 
buyer B stopped sourcing from a supplier S in a given country c in year t relative to the 
year before.	ܥ௖௧ is a variable that measures the strength of contract enforcement 
institutions in country c in year t. ܴ஻ௌ௧ିଵ measures the length of the relationship between 
buyer B and supplier S up until the prior year. ܳ஻ௌ௧ିଵ measures the number of countries 
that supplier S supplies buyer B from in the prior year. ஻ܲௌ௖௧ିଵ measures the order value-
weighted price per unit of goods shipped to the buyer, by the seller, from the given 
country of origin, in the prior year. ߞ஻, ߟ௧, and 	ߴ௣ are sets of dummy variables 
corresponding to buyer firm, year, and product category fixed effects. ߝ஻ௌ௖௧ is the error 
term. I use logistic regression because my dependent variable is a binary variable and 
because the results are easier to interpret when the coefficients are reported in odds ratio 
form.9 Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics for these variables, while Table 1.2 
shows the correlations between them. 
                                                 
9 In my analysis logistic regression is also equivalent to evaluating a Cox proportional 
hazards model as there are no instances in my data in which a relationship that has been 
terminated is reinitiated and re-terminated. 
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 1.2: Correlations 
 
1.3.3 Dependent Variable 
Terminated: This variable measures whether a buyer stopped sourcing from a 
given supplier in a particular country of origin. Terminated is set to zero if the buyer 
sourced a positive amount from the supplier in the given country of origin in the current 
year. It is set to one if the buyer did source a positive amount from the supplier in that 
country of origin in the prior year, but did not source at all from this supplier-country pair 
in the current year. The variable is created for all buyer-supplier-country triad in 2008 
and 2009. 2007 observations are dropped because many independent variables and 
controls are lagged. 
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1.3.4 Independent Variables 
Contract Viability: I use the Contract Viability variable from the International 
Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 2011) to measure the strength of the contract 
enforcement institutions in the country of origin. This variable measures “the risk of 
unilateral contract modification and, at worst, outright expropriation of foreign assets” 
and ranges from 0.5 to 4 for the countries in this sample, where four indicates the 
strongest enforcement of contracts. While the measure is available monthly, I average it 
by year for this analysis.10 I use this measure of contract enforcement both because it is 
commonly used in the academic literature and is, arguably, the most granular metric 
available for a large sample of countries that is consistently measured over long time 
periods. In the robustness section I re-conduct this analysis using alternative institutional 
measures, particularly the Heritage Foundation’s index of property rights (Heritage 
Foundation 2011) which measures both property rights and the ability of firms to enforce 
contracts in the courts. 
Relationship Duration: This variable measures the number of years that a buyer 
sourced from a given supplier (irrespective of country of origin) from 2007 up until the 
prior year of the observation. Consequently, if, for a buyer-supplier pair in 2008, there 
had been orders between that buyer and that supplier in 2007, Relationship Duration 
would be set to 1. If, for a buyer-supplier-country pair in 2009, there were orders in 2008 
and 2007, Relationship Duration would be set to 2. Though there is reason to think that 
the last year to two years does convey information about the relationship, this measure 
                                                 
10 Out of the 56 countries in the sample, in only one country did Contract Viability 
change more than once per year between 2007-2009. In this country, Mongolia, Contract 
Viability temporarily dipped from 3 to 2.5 in 2007, fell from 3 to 2.5 and then 2 in 2008, 
and fluctuated between 2 and 2.5 in 2009. 
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only weakly captures the prior history of a relationship. Therefore, in the robustness 
section I re-conduct this analysis measuring the history of the relationship going back to 
2003. 
Buyer Supplier Countries: This variable measures the number of countries in 
which a supplier manufactures products for a given buyer, in the prior year. I include this 
variable to control for the fact that buyers may be less willing to terminate relationships 
with suppliers that they source from across several countries. 
1.3.5 Controls 
Price: Buyers would be expected to stop orders from higher priced suppliers than 
cheaper priced suppliers. Consequently, I include the order value-weighted average price 
per unit, in US dollars for all purchase orders for the buyer-supplier-country pair in the 
year prior to the observation. Orders that were not in US dollars were converted using 
annual exchange rates from www.oanda.com. 
1.4 Empirical Results 
As a first step in my analysis I conduct a series of means comparisons to see 
whether my independent variables have a substantial impact on whether or not a 
relationship was terminated. I classified countries as either strong contract enforcement 
countries or weak contract enforcement countries using the median value of Contract 
Viability and Property Rights for the countries in my sample. I classified countries as 
“High Contract Viability” if they had a Contract Viability value greater than the median 
(3.5) and “Low Contract Viability” otherwise. Similarly, I classified countries as “High 
Property Rights” if they had a value greater than the median (50) and “Low Property 
Rights” otherwise. I then allocated my observations between these categories depending 
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on the institutions of the country, and conducted t-tests on the mean of Terminated 
between the groups. In both cases the number of observations in the weak category far 
outweighed the number in the strong category because more sourcing in my sample was 
conducted with countries with weak contract enforcement institutions. I report these 
results in Table 1.3. Here we see that the average observation was terminated 38.6% of 
the time in countries with at or below median Contract Viability, and 47.9% of the time 
in countries with above median Contract Viability. A t-test of these means showed the 
difference to be significant below the 1% level. Similarly, observations were terminated 
38.8% of the time in countries with at or below median Property Rights, and 43.5% of the 
time in countries with above median Property Rights. Again, a comparison of these 
means showed the difference to be significant below the 1% level. Both of these 
comparisons conform to my predictions in hypothesis 1. 
Table 1.3: Comparison of Means (t-tests) by Contract Viability, Property Rights, 
and Relationship Duration 
 
I also separated observations by whether the relationship11 had existed for just one 
year or whether the relationship had persisted for two or more years. Here observations 
                                                 
11 The buyer had sourced from that supplier in that country previously. 
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were terminated 46.9% of the time when the relationship had persisted for two or more 
years and 35.5% of the time when the relationship had only existed for one year. This is 
puzzling given that we would expect the value of commitment to be higher the longer a 
relationship has existed since a supplier’s expectations of the future value of a 
relationship are strengthened by prior interaction, as documented in Poppo et al. (2008). 
However, a significant problem with these averages is that they do not account for the 
fact that these relationships were terminated or kept by different buyers in different years. 
Consequently, if, for example, a particular buyer had exclusively longer relationships and 
had to terminate them because of financial trouble this would increase the mean in the 
long relationship category but not because he was more likely to keep suppliers with 
which he had shorter relationships. To address this problem, I calculate the share of 
observations terminated by each buyer-year pair and subtract this from the Terminated 
value for each observation. I then used these de-meaned values for Terminated and re-
conduct the means tests in this table. The results are in the fifth column in Table 1.3. Here 
we see that our results remain the same when I split the sample by median country 
Contract Viability and Property Rights (the mean in the strong group is higher than the 
mean in the low group, and the difference is significant). However, when I split the group 
by relationship duration we find that a higher share of shorter relationships were 
terminated than longer relationships. The difference between the means for relationship 
duration was, however, not statistically significant. 
To get a clearer picture of how these various factors affected the likelihood that a 
relationship was terminated I ran a series of regressions using my empirical model from 
Section 1.3.2. Because I suspect that different buyers were affected differently by the 
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crisis and that the likelihood that a relationship was terminated depended on how far the 
crisis had progressed, I include buyer and year fixed effects in all of my regressions. 
Further, because I expect errors to be correlated between observations with the same 
buyer, I cluster errors at the level of the buyer. (See Section 1.5.3 for regressions 
including product and country fixed effects and clustering at the country level). In all 
tables in this chapter, coefficients are reported as odds ratios.12 
I present my first results in Table 1.4. In regressions ii-iv we see that a one point 
increase in Contract Viability made it 1.5-1.52 times more likely that the relationship 
would be terminated. In regressions iii-iv we see that longer relationships were less likely 
to be terminated. Relationships that had persisted for two years or more were between 
1.54-1.56 times13 less likely to be terminated than relationships that had only persisted for 
a year. The number of countries a supplier manufactured goods in for a buyer was not a 
statistically significant predictor of whether a relationship was terminated, as we see in 
regression iv. Also, in all of these regressions I did not find a statistically significant 
relationship between price and whether a relationship was terminated. Consequently, 
these initial results provide strong evidence for hypothesis 1. Buyers were much more 
likely to terminate their relationships with suppliers in countries where contract 
enforcement institutions were strong and less likely in countries where institutions were 
weak. Further, the importance of the contracting environment far outweighs cost 
considerations. Combined, these results suggest that buyers were in a situation similar to 
                                                 
12 A coefficient value above 1 indicates that an increase in the independent variable 
makes the dependent variable more likely and vice versa. 
13 1/0.642 to 1/0.650 
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scenario 2 where their reliance on relational contracting was hindering their flexibility in 
optimally reconfiguring their supplier networks in response to the financial crisis. 
Table 1.4: Logit of Terminated on Independent Variables 
 
I next look at the interactions between my main independent variables, Contract 
Viability and Relationship Duration. To facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients of 
the interaction term I centered both variables. Further, I multiplied the centered Contract 
Viability by negative one so that a large value would indicate a weak environment. The 
results of this regression are presented in Table 1.5. Contract Viability and Relationship 
Duration remain significant and have the same directional impact on whether a 
relationship is terminated or not. However, the interaction between the negative Contract 
Viability and the Relationship Duration is not significant. Consequently, I do not find 
evidence that a longer relationship made it less likely that a relationship was terminated 
in a weak contract enforcement country than in a strong contract enforcement country. 
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Table 1.5: Logit of Terminated on Contract Viability, Relationship Duration, and 
Interactions 
 
1.4.1 MNC Suppliers 
One element of my empirical setting that was not addressed in the model is that a 
growing number of suppliers in international contract manufacturing have operations in 
multiple countries. In this data, many suppliers manufacture for the buyers across 
different countries. In 2007, 54% of buyer-supplier-country triads involved multinational 
(MNC) suppliers. There are many reasons to believe that these MNC suppliers are 
affected by local contracting institutions differently than local-only suppliers (see Chapter 
2 for an extensive investigation of this issue). Specifically, due to the ability to enforce 
contracts against a MNC supplier in a country other than the local country, and due to the 
ability to punish a MNC supplier for reneging on an agreement by terminating orders 
with him in other countries or damaging his reputation in other markets, we might expect 
MNC suppliers to be treated similarly to suppliers based in strong enforcement countries, 
i.e. their orders would be terminated much more frequently than local-only suppliers, 
particularly in weak contract enforcement countries. I thus run a series of regressions, 
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similar to those in Table 1.4, including a dummy variable indicating whether the supplier 
was a MNC or local-only supplier (MNC Flag). The supplier was categorized as a MNC 
if he had offices in more than one country, shipped from more than one country, or had 
offices in a different country than the country shipped from. In all other cases the supplier 
was classified as local-only. 
The results of my regressions when I include the MNC status of the supplier are 
presented in Table 1.6.  In regressions ii-iv we see that the coefficients on Contract 
Viability stay virtually identical to the coefficients in Table 1.4 in terms of direction, 
significance and magnitude.  Similarly, the coefficients on Relationship Duration stay 
very similar, though the significance of Relationship Duration in regression iii in Table 
1.6 falls to the 10% significance level from the 5% significance level in Table 1.4. 
However, the coefficient on MNC Flag is not significant across these regressions. I 
interpret these results to suggest that MNC suppliers were not treated differently from 
local-only suppliers when it came to the decision whether or not to stop ordering from 
them during the financial crisis. To ensure that the MNC status of a supplier is not a 
significant consideration I include MNC Flag as a control in the remainder of the 
regressions where appropriate. 
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Table 1.6: Logit of Terminated on MNC Flag and other Independent Variables 
 
1.5 Robustness Checks 
While my results suggest that buyers were strongly influenced by contract 
enforcement considerations when choosing which suppliers to terminate relationships 
with during the financial crisis, there are several aspects of my analysis that are a cause of 
concern. Firstly, my main independent variable Contract Viability may not be an accurate 
measure of contract enforcement. Secondly, buyers could be making their decisions 
based on other institutions that contract enforcement happens to be correlated with, or a 
country’s overall level of development. Thirdly, it could be the case that buyers are 
keeping suppliers not based on relational contracting considerations but instead based on 
changes in demand for different types of products. Alternatively, my measurement of the 
duration of the relationship may consider an insufficiently long period of time. It could 
also be the case that other factors at the country level are driving my results. Finally, it 
could also be the case that suppliers in countries with strong contract enforcement 
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institutions went out of business during the financial crisis and stopped being available as 
suppliers. I conduct a series of robustness checks below to address these issues. 
1.5.1 Alternate Measures of the Contract Enforcement 
One area of concern is that Contract Viability may be constructed such that it only 
weakly measures contract enforcement institutions but is correlated with another 
underlying institution which buyers are reacting to. To allay this concern I re-run my 
regressions in Table 1.4 replacing Contract Viability with the Heritage Foundation’s 
index of Property Rights. This index measures "the degree to which a country’s laws 
protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those 
laws. It also assesses … the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts." I 
present the results of this regression in Table 1.7. The coefficient on Property Rights 
remains highly significant in all of the regressions and the other results are largely 
identical to the results in Table 1.4. The only substantial difference is that the coefficient 
on Property Rights is much smaller. This is, in part, because Property Rights is scaled 
from 0 to 100, and is also because the index measures property rights protection in 
addition to contract enforcement. These regressions imply that a ten point increase in 
Property Rights makes it 1.15 times14 more likely that a relationship will be terminated. 
                                                 
14 1.014^10 
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Table 1.7: Logit of Terminated on Property Rights and other Independent Variables 
 
1.5.2 Alternate Institutions 
Another area of concern is my choice of institution. It could be the case that 
buyers are not reacting to contracting institutions but another institution with which 
contract enforcement institutions are correlated. To address this I first select five other 
variables from the International Country Risk Guide that are likely to affect sourcing 
performance in a country. These five variables measure the ease of repatriating profits 
(Repatriation), the risk of payment delays (Payment Delays), prevalence of corruption 
(Corruption), quality of government and regulatory agencies (Bureaucratic Quality), and 
the strength of law and order (Law & Order). Since these institutional measures are 
highly correlated with each other and Contract Viability, I orthogonalized them and used 
them together with Contract Viability as independent variables in a logistic regression 
with Terminated as the dependent variable. I present the results in Table 1.8. In this 
regression we see that only Contract Viability and Repatriation are significant. Further, 
the coefficient on Contract Viability is larger. Since it is implausible that buyers made 
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their decision whether to keep sourcing from a supplier based on the ease of transferring 
money out of the host country, I interpret these results to suggest that contracting 
institutions were the key institutions explaining which suppliers were kept. 
Table 1.8: Logit of Terminated on Orthogonalized Institutions 
 
We might also be worried that firms are primarily responding to changes in local 
wages and are terminating relationships in countries where average wages increased. This 
could explain my results if wages in countries with strong contract enforcement also 
experienced increases in wages, and wages in countries with weak institutions decreased. 
To examine this I rerun my analysis including data on the annual percentage change in 
average real wages per country (Change in Wages) from the Economist Intelligence Unit 
(EIU 2011). The results are presented in Table 1.9. The coefficient on Change in Wages 
in regression i suggests that relationships were actually less likely to be terminated when 
wages increased. Further, when including institutions and my other independent variables, 
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the statistical significance of the change in wages disappears. The other results remain 
similar to my earlier findings except that the significance on the coefficient on Contract 
Viability is reduced to the 10% level when the Change in Wages is included. 
Table 1.9: Logit of Terminated on Change in Wages and Other Independent 
Variables 
 
It could also be the case that Contract Viability and Property Rights are proxying 
for the level of development of the host country. This is an especially large concern 
because both variables are highly correlated with GDP per capita. To address this, I 
orthogonalize Contract Viability and Property Rights, separately, with GDP per capita 
and total GDP, and regress them in pairs together with the other variables from the full 
empirical model. I present the results in Table 1.10 and they are largely similar to the 
results in the full model. Both Contract Viability and Property Rights remain highly 
significant in all of the regressions. As a result of the orthogonalization the magnitude of 
the coefficient on Contract Viability is slightly diminished, and the magnitude of the 
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coefficient on Property Rights is greatly increased. The only measure of GDP that is 
significant is GDP per capita, and only in regression i. 
Table 1.10: Logit of Terminated on Institutions and GDP 
 
1.5.3 Alternate Controls 
Yet another area of concern is that buyers source different types of products from 
strong institution countries than in weak institution countries. Consequently, buyers may 
be terminating relationships in strong institution countries because demand for those 
products has declined more than the demand for the type of products sourced from weak 
institution countries. To investigate this concern I look at the sub-sample of my data that 
includes Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes. I aggregate the orders to the buyer-
supplier-country-2 digit HTS code level by year and estimate the model using this data. I 
present the results of this analysis in Table 1.11. The results are broadly consistent with 
the initial analysis except that the significance of many variables is slightly diminished. 
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Contract Viability is only significant at the 5% level and the magnitude of the coefficient 
is diminished. Both the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on Relationship 
Duration, in all of the regressions increases. 
Table 1.11: Logit of Terminated on Independent Variables, HTS Sample 
 
Another issue regards my measurement of Relationship Duration seeing as it only 
measures the number of years a buyer-supplier pair have worked together from 2007 to 
the current year. To address this I re-conducted my analysis using the subset of firms for 
which data was available going back to 2003. I present the results of this analysis in 
Table 1.12. Here, Relationship Duration, measures the number of years a buyer and a 
supplier have worked together from 2003 up to the current year. Again, the results are 
largely similar to my earlier analysis. Here, an additional year of working together results 
in it being 1.1 to 1.2 times15 less likely that the relationship was terminated. 
                                                 
15 1/0.88 to 1/0.843 
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Table 1.12: Logit of Terminated on Institutions, 2003-2009 Sample 
 
Finally, we may still be concerned that there are other unobserved factors at the 
country level that may be correlated with contract enforcement institutions. To 
investigate this I reconducted my initial analysis while including country-of-origin fixed 
effects and clustering the standard errors by the country of origin. I present these results 
in Table 1.13. These coefficients on Contract Viability differ substantially from my 
earlier analyses and appear to suggest that stronger contracting institutions decrease the 
likelihood that a relationship will be terminated. I attribute this to the role of the country 
fixed effect. Since the baseline country effect is now zeroed out in these regressions, the 
coefficient on Contract Viability is measuring the effect of a change in Contract Viability. 
Thus it is the small number of countries whose contracting institutions changed from 
2008 to 2009 that are driving this result. Only eight countries in my sample had a 
Contract Viability value that changed and in all cases the value of their contract 
enforcement declined. The vast majority of these declines occurred in countries which 
already had strong institutions. The largest drops in Contract Viability occurred in the UK 
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where it fell from 3.75 to 3, Spain from 4 to 3.6, France from 3.92 to 3.5, and the US 3.9 
to 3.7. Consequently these results are suggesting that a decrease in Contract Viability led 
to a higher likelihood that a relationship was terminated because most of the decreases in 
Contract Viability occurred in countries that already had high levels of contract 
enforcement. 
Table 1.13: Logit of Terminated on Independent Variables with Country Fixed 
Effects and Errors Clustered by Country 
 
1.5.4 Did Suppliers in Strong Enforcement Countries Exit? 
A final concern we may have is that suppliers in countries with strong contract 
enforcement institutions exited their businesses during the financial crisis at a higher rate 
than suppliers in countries with weak contract enforcement institutions, for reasons 
unrelated to the fact that their relationships were more likely to be terminated with buyers 
that sourced internationally. If this were the case, perhaps because of an ongoing shift to 
source from new developing countries that are more likely to have weak contract 
enforcement institutions, then buyers would not be terminating relationships because of a 
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need to preserve relationships due to relational contracting considerations but simply 
because these suppliers had gone out of business. To address this concern I check which 
suppliers out of the ones used on terminated and non-terminated relationships were active 
on the platform and shipping orders to any buyer in 2010. Specifically, I divide the 
countries in my sample into high and low contract enforcement countries by splitting 
them into two groups using the median country values of Contract Viability and Property 
Rights.16 I then calculate the number of relationships that were terminated in strong and 
weak contract enforcement countries, and determine the number of these relationships 
where the supplier was still active in 2010. Using these two numbers I calculate the 
percentage of these terminated relationships where the supplier was still active in 2010 
for countries with strong and weak enforcement and conduct a means comparison 
between the two groups. The results are in Table 1.14.  
                                                 
16 A country with a Contract Viability value above or equal to the median was given a 
Strong Contract Viability value of one, zero otherwise. Similarly, a country with a 
Property Rights value above or equal to the median was given a Strong Property Rights 
value of one, zero otherwise. 
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Table 1.14: Relationships with Suppliers Operating in 2010 
 
The results are striking. Of the relationships that were terminated 19.9% of the 
relationships in countries with strong enforcement (as measured by Contract Viability) 
were with suppliers that still transacted on the platform in 2010. In contrast only 15.1% 
of relationships terminated in countries with weak enforcement were with suppliers that 
were still on the platform in 2010. Using a t-test, the former average was significantly 
above the latter, below the 1% significance level. The results are similar when 
categorizing countries by Property Rights, though the percentage of relationships 
terminated in strong countries whose suppliers still existed on the platform was 18.8%, 
the percentage in weak countries was 16.2%, and a t-test found that these were 
significantly different only at the 10% level. These results provide substantial evidence 
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that buyers were not terminating more relationships in countries with strong enforcement 
because these suppliers had exited in higher numbers than suppliers in weak enforcement 
countries, since it was less likely that the terminated suppliers in strong enforcement 
countries had exited. These results suggest that, if anything, the suppliers used in 
countries with strong institutions were less likely to have gone out of business than the 
suppliers used in countries with weak institutions, even though their relationships were 
terminated more frequently by these buyers. 
1.6 Discussion 
In this chapter I set out to examine whether there were hidden costs to using 
private enforcement mechanisms – specifically relational contracting – as a means of 
overcoming weak contract enforcement institutions, that only revealed themselves when 
firms had to reconfigure their international supplier networks in response to a crisis. To 
do this I developed a model that predicted how buyers would select which relationships 
to keep and which to terminate based on the supplier’s local contract enforcement 
environment. I then used a unique set of data on international contract manufacturing 
purchase orders to test whether these predictions were born out. In all cases, my results 
confirmed my predictions. Buyers did systematically shield their relationships with 
suppliers in weak contract enforcement countries at the expense of suppliers in stronger 
enforcement countries for reasons that cannot be explained by cost, and also protected 
relationships that had existed for longer periods of time. These results held in the face of 
a host of robustness checks. These findings suggest that, in the context of global sourcing, 
relying on relational contracting can decrease a firm’s flexibility to optimally configure 
its supplier networks, and weak institutions can protect local suppliers. 
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Several aspects of this paper provide foundations for future research. Few papers 
in international business use formal modeling, and this chapter demonstrates that we can 
gain a better understanding of rich international business phenomena by using formal 
models. Further this paper shows how modeling techniques used in organizational 
economics can be easily applied in an international business setting, due to their flexible 
and tractable nature. Using formal models like these to understand cross border 
phenomena, and global supply chains in particular, is likely to be a rich avenue of future 
research. There is also enormous scope for future work that investigates more thoroughly 
how firms use relational contracting and other private enforcement mechanisms to do 
business in countries with weak institutions and poor business environments. As global 
companies continue to do ever-more activities in countries with weak institutions the 
importance of understanding the benefits and limitations of using relational contracting is 
only likely to increase. 
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Sourcing from Multinational Suppliers to Overcome Weak 
Contracting Institutions and Gain Supply Chain Capabilities 
2.1 Introduction 
The way in which the boundaries of the firm respond to differences in institutions 
has been an active area of research in the recent international trade and international 
business literatures. When firms look to produce overseas they choose to produce 
internally (vertically integrate) instead of outsourcing to third parties in response to 
contracting hazards and weak institutional environments (Henisz 2000, Antras and 
Helpman 2004, Yeaple 2006, Feenstra and Hanson 2005). However, firms are 
increasingly outsourcing sections of their value chains to third parties in very weak 
institutional environments. Though some work exists looking at how firms use private 
enforcement mechanisms to substitute for weak institutions (McMillan and Woodruff 
1999, Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff 2002, Lerner and Schoar 2005, Antras and Foley 
2011), this work misses an increasingly important phenomenon in global outsourcing, 
namely, outsourcing overseas to suppliers that are themselves multinational firms.  
In this chapter I postulate that using a multinational (MNC) supplier provides a 
buyer with several advantages relative to using a local supplier when sourcing from a 
given country. A MNC supplier based in a country with strong institutions could provide 
a bridge by which buyers could source from new, low cost, poor institution locations. In 
cases of contract disputes, the MNC supplier could be taken to court in its home country 
where legal institutions are stronger. Further, a MNC supplier may be less likely to 
renege on an agreement in one country if doing so will lead to a loss of business in 
another country. I also hypothesize that buyers may choose to use MNC suppliers 
because they have superior capabilities relative to local suppliers. Specifically, MNC 
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suppliers may be able to help buyers coordinate their multi-country multi-product 
sourcing, may be able to compensate for a lack of buyer experience sourcing from the 
particular country, and may have greater economies of scale by aggregating orders from 
several buyers. However, I also postulate that using MNC suppliers incurs costs relative 
to their local-only counterparts and thus MNC suppliers are only used when their benefits 
outweigh their costs.  
In this chapter I investigate the degree to which MNC suppliers are used instead 
of local suppliers in order to overcome weak contracting institutions and to access 
supplier capabilities that benefit buyers with particular characteristics. Firstly, I look at 
whether firms are using MNC suppliers to overcome weaknesses in host country 
contracting institutions or other institutions. Secondly, I look at whether buyers choose 
MNC suppliers because they are able to provide services that help the buyer manage the 
breadth of products a buyer sources. Thirdly, I look at whether a buyer’s experience in 
the sourcing country obviates its need to use MNC suppliers. Fourthly, I look at the 
impact the size of a buyer’s supplier network has on the likelihood that an order will be 
given to a local or MNC supplier. Finally, I look at the impact that the total volume of a 
buyer’s sourcing has on the choice of supplier type. 
To conduct this investigation I use a unique set of international contract 
manufacturing orders containing the global orders of ten, US-based, buyers and their 350 
suppliers in the sportswear, apparel, footwear, toy, and furniture industries. In this sample, 
the orders were sourced from 21 countries and were worth $1.6bn between 2007 and 
2009.  
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I find strong evidence that both contract enforcement institutions and the 
characteristics of buyers that make MNC supplier capabilities particularly valuable, play 
a strong role in determining whether a buyer uses a MNC or local supplier. Buyers were 
much more likely to use MNC suppliers in weak contracting environments, when they 
had many different types of product to produce, when they had little experience sourcing 
from the given country, when they had a small supplier network, and when their total 
sourcing volumes were small.  
The chapter is laid out as follows. In Section 2.2 I lay out the hypotheses that I 
will investigate. In Section 2.3 I describe the outsourcing data that this chapter uses, and 
describe the independent variables and controls used in my analysis. The empirical 
analysis is presented in Section 2.4. I look at the robustness of the choice of my 
institutional measures in Section 2.5. I conclude in Section 2.6. 
2.2 Hypotheses 
Contracting institutions have increasingly become a center of attention in the 
international trade and international business literatures. The strength of contract 
enforcement has been found to affect the decision to set up wholly owned subsidiaries or 
outsource to third parties (Yeaple 2006), the decision to extend credit (McMillan and 
Woodruff 1999, Johnson et al. 2002, Antras and Foley 2011) and firm performance 
(Taussig 2011). In the context of international contract manufacturing, contract 
enforcement has a particularly significant effect on performance because buyers typically 
have no ownership stake in the supplier. When contract enforcement institutions are weak, 
buyers can not rely on contract penalties and must instead rely on other, usually costlier 
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or less effective mechanisms to ensure that shipments are delivered on time, in the right 
quantities, made to the correct specifications, and of sufficient quality. 
I postulate that one mechanism to reduce the negative effects on performance of a 
weak contract enforcement environment is to source from a MNC supplier instead of a 
local-only supplier, for several reasons. Firstly, many MNC suppliers also operate in 
countries with stronger contract enforcement institutions and can be prosecuted for 
breach of contract in these countries. The MNC supplier is effectively renting higher 
quality foreign institutions (Seigel 2005). Secondly, the buyer may be transacting with 
the MNC supplier in multiple countries and can use the threat of cancelling orders in 
several countries to enforce contract compliance in a weak institution country. Thirdly, a 
MNC supplier may be more likely to comply with a contract because the damage to its 
reputation may be greater because it works with a larger number of buyers, has a larger 
volume of orders, or has a more visible international profile. Consequently, by operating 
in multiple countries, a MNC supplier is undertaking Ghemawat’s (2003) economic 
function of arbitrage by deriving a location specific advantage through its cross-border 
presence. 
However, a MNC supplier is also likely to incur additional costs relative to a local 
supplier because it must maintain offices in other, potentially higher cost, countries, faces 
liabilities of foreignness that increase its costs (labor, land, permits), and the 
fragmentation of management attention across multiple locations. Consequently, I 
hypothesize that buyers will only use MNC suppliers when the benefits to using them, e.g. 
their ability to lessen the negative performance effects of weak institutions, outweigh 
their additional higher costs. Specifically, buyers are likely to use MNC suppliers more 
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frequently when contracting institutions for a particular country are weak and more likely 
to use local suppliers in countries with stronger contract enforcement institutions. 
Hypothesis 1: A buyer is increasingly likely to use a MNC supplier than a local 
supplier the weaker the contract enforcement institutions in the given country being 
sourced from. 
Another arbitraging advantage a MNC supplier gains through its cross border 
operations is the ability to gain both local knowledge as well as knowledge of working 
with international buyers. Through the MNC supplier’s local operations it can gain a 
deeper knowledge of local business practices and regulations than a foreign buyer that 
has little experience in that country. In addition, through its overseas operations, a MNC 
supplier can develop a knowledge of the processes and expectations of international 
buyers that provide it with an advantage relative to local suppliers.17 However, this 
advantage erodes if the buyer has a long experience of sourcing from the given country 
and has developed extensive knowledge of how to source effectively from local suppliers. 
Consequently, with the additional costs of using MNC suppliers, I hypothesize that 
buyers with longer experience sourcing from a given country are less likely to source 
from MNC suppliers than buyers with less experience. 
Hypothesis 2: A buyer with more experience sourcing from a given country is less 
likely to source from a MNC supplier than a local one. 
An alternative reason a buyer may choose to source from a MNC supplier is that 
the supplier has capabilities that are valuable to the buyer. Li & Fung, for example, has 
claimed that it is better able to manage the production and assembly of different 
                                                 
17 The advantage also erodes as local suppliers become more sophisticated. This is likely 
correlated with the overall level of economic development, which I control for. 
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components of products than a buyer typically is on its own. Further, the company claims 
that, through its network of suppliers, it is better able to find the best producer across 
different countries for different types of products than a foreign buyer would be on its 
own and that, by aggregating sourcing needs across multiple buyers, they are able to get 
greater economies of scale in their operations (Magretta 1998). In the context of this 
analysis, I hypothesize that a MNC supplier has capabilities related to sourcing different 
types of products, sourcing products from multiple countries, and achieving economies 
from scale. Each of these capabilities is an example of Ghemawat’s aggregation function 
as it is through their cross border operations that MNC suppliers are better able to offer 
multiple types of products, a wider array of manufacturing locations, and, indirectly 
through the resulting larger order volumes, economies of scale. However, as before, these 
MNC capabilities are likely to come with increased costs and they may be less relevant 
for certain buyers or can be substituted for with a buyer’s own capabilities. A MNC 
supplier’s ability to source multiple products is less valuable to a buyer that does not need 
to source many products. Similarly, a buyer that works with a larger network of suppliers 
has less need of a MNC supplier’s capabilities in sourcing multiple products from 
different locations. Further, a buyer with larger sourcing volumes has less need of the 
economies of scale that MNC suppliers can amass through aggregating orders from 
multiple buyers. Consequently, I hypothesize that buyers choose MNC suppliers only 
when the MNC supplier’s capabilities are valuable to the buyer because of that buyer’s 
characteristics. 
Hypothesis 3: A buyer that sources many different types of products is more likely 
to source from a MNC supplier than a local supplier. 
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Hypothesis 4: A buyer with a larger network of suppliers is less likely to source 
from a MNC supplier than a local one. 
Hypothesis 5: A buyer with larger sourcing volumes is less likely to source from a 
MNC supplier than a local supplier. 
Some of these hypotheses were validated in interviews with managers. Several 
managers claimed that they were starting to source from new, lower cost countries with 
the help of MNC suppliers who they had sourced from previously in other countries. A 
purchasing manager for a major footwear retailer that also sells shoes under its own 
labels explained that his firm particularly chose to source from its core, multinational 
suppliers in countries with weak business environments. Further the company particularly 
preferred to use these suppliers when entering countries with poor environments where it 
did not have prior experience because these MNC suppliers often had shorter lead times 
and faster effective shipping times than local suppliers. Though he denied that these 
suppliers received explicitly higher prices, he mentioned that the firm was trying to shift 
more production away from these suppliers to achieve lower prices, particularly in 
countries where they had established supplier networks. Other managers explained how it 
was particularly helpful to have suppliers that could produce different components in 
different locations. A purchasing manager in a large diversified capital goods company, 
that sourced from around the world, noted that his company particularly favored suppliers 
that could supply more varieties of products as this helped their ongoing efforts to 
rationalize their purchasing. 
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2.3 Data 
Remarkably little quantitative research has been done on international outsourcing 
and little, if any, large sample research has been done on MNC suppliers, due to the lack 
of data. Most of the research that has been done either looks at outsourcing within a given 
country (for which there is little institutional variation) or looks at the activities that 
multinationals conduct across countries (offshoring instead of outsourcing). To look at 
the transactions between buyers and their suppliers across multiple countries, this 
investigation uses a unique dataset of confidential company data. This data comes from a 
provider of cloud-based software for supply chain oversight and management used by 
many global buyers.   
The data used in this chapter includes all of the purchase orders between ten US-
based companies and their 350 suppliers in the sportswear, apparel, footwear, toy, and 
furniture industries, shipping from 21 countries during 2007-2009. (See Table 2.1 for a 
breakdown of order volumes and Table 2.2 for order counts by country.) There were 
99,063 purchase orders18 in total worth $1.6bn during this period, and there were 
frequently hundreds of orders between a given buyer and a supplier sourced from a given 
country within each year. Of these purchase orders, 64% were given to MNC suppliers, 
and orders relating to perfume and toiletries, plastics, headgear and furniture were 
particularly likely to be given to MNC suppliers while orders for toys were particularly 
likely to be given to local suppliers. (See Table 2.3 for a breakdown of orders by tariff 
                                                 
18 In this sample only orders containing Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) data were 
used as it is plausible that buyers choose whether to use MNCs instead of local suppliers 
differently for different types of products. By using orders with HTS data I can include 
product fixed effects and measure the diversity of products that buyers source. 
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category.) The average purchase order for a MNC supplier was $16,049, only slightly 
higher than for local suppliers, $15,807. 
Table 2.1: Total Value of Orders ($m) by Country 
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Table 2.2: Count of Orders by Country 
 
  
   59
Table 2.3: MNC vs. Local Suppliers  
2 Digit 
HTS 
Code HTS Description 
Count of 
Orders 
% to 
Local 
Suppliers 
% to 
MNC 
Suppliers
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts; dyes, pigments, paints, varnishes, putty and mastics  1 100% 0% 
33 Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or toilet preparations 4112 0% 100% 
39 Plastics and articles thereof 11 36.4% 63.6% 
42 
Articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel 
goods, handbags and similar containers; articles 
of animal gut 
1057 42.5% 57.5% 
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted 54,144 38.6% 61.4% 
62 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted 18,548 27.5% 72.5% 
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles 19994 45.8% 54.2% 
65 Headgear and parts thereof 593 13.2% 86.8% 
94 
Furniture; bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, 
cushions and similar stuffed furnishings; lamps 
and lighting fittings 
27 33.3% 66.7% 
95 Toys, games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof 576 61.5% 38.5% 
 
Total 99,063 36.4% 63.6% 
 
Out of the 350 suppliers, 232 were local while 118 suppliers were multinational. 
The data used for this chapter contains information on the size of the purchase order, its 
country of origin, the average price per unit, date ordered, date shipped, the type of 
product (indicated by an eight digit US Harmonized Tariff Schedule code), the location 
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of the supplier’s office that processed the order, and the year in which the order was 
made. Throughout this chapter I analyze this data at the level of the purchase order. 
2.3.1 Dependent Variables 
The main dependent variable used in this investigation is whether or not the order 
was given to a MNC or local supplier. The supplier was categorized as local (MNC 
flag=0) if, on all transactions on the platform between 2007 and 2009, the supplier’s 
office(s) was in only one country, all transactions involving that supplier were shipped 
from only one country, and the country the office was located in and the country goods 
were shipped from were the same. The supplier was categorized as being multinational 
(MNC flag=1) in all other cases. However, there is a potential bias towards categorizing a 
buyer as local, when it is in fact a multinational. The supplier may have offices in other 
countries, or ship from other countries but only serves the buyers on the platform from 
one country and from the office in that country. This is less of a concern for this 
investigation because categorizing MNC suppliers as local biases the investigation away 
from finding that there is a difference between the transactions allocated to local vs. 
MNC firms. Furthermore, from the point of view of the buyers in this sample, these 
suppliers are more similar in the services they provide to local suppliers.  
To identify whether a supplier was chosen based on the fact that it has operations 
in a country with strong contract enforcement (where it could be sued for damages in 
case of breach of contract) I also create another dependent variable Strong MNC. Here, 
all countries in the sample were ranked based on the strength of their contract 
enforcement and classified as strong enforcement if they were above the median. Next, 
all suppliers who had operations in at least one strong enforcement country were 
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classified as being strong enforcement suppliers. If an order had a strong enforcement 
supplier it was assigned a Strong MNC value of one, if not, zero.19 
2.3.2 Independent Variables 
The main independent variable in this study is the strength of contract 
enforcement. This analysis primarily uses the Contract Viability variable from the 
International Country Risk Guide (PRS Group 2011) as its main measure of the strength 
of the contract enforcement institutions in the country sourced from. This measures “the 
risk of unilateral contract modification and, at worst, outright expropriation of foreign 
assets”20 and ranges from zero to four (2.25-4 for the countries in the sample), in 
increments of 0.5, where four indicates the strongest enforcement of contracts. While the 
measure is available monthly, it is averaged by year for the purpose of this investigation. 
This measure of contract enforcement is used both because it is commonly used in the 
academic literature and is, arguably, the most granular metric available for a large sample 
of countries that is consistently measured over long time periods. For robustness, the 
analysis is replicated using the Property Rights measure from the Heritage Foundation 
(Heritage Foundation 2011). This measure ranges from 5 to 95 (10-90 for the sample) 
where 95 implies strong protection of property rights and quick and efficient enforcement 
of contracts. I compare both Contract Viability and Property Rights against a set of other 
institutional indices from the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation in the robustness section 
of this chapter. 
                                                 
19 As this dependent variable is only used in samples that only consider orders in 
countries with weak institutions, all suppliers with operations in strong enforcement 
countries were, by default, MNCs. 
20 Guide to Data Variables, the PRS Group (accessed February 2011) 
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To look at the second hypothesis I calculate how many years a buyer has been 
sourcing from a given country from 2007 up to the year in which a given order is placed 
(Buyer Country Experience). For example, an order placed in 2008 in a given country for 
a buyer that had also placed orders from that country in 2007 would be assigned a Buyer 
Country Experience value of 2.  
To investigate the third hypothesis, I tally how many product categories a buyer 
sources in each year (Buyer HTS02 Count). For this data, the majority of transactions 
have information on the type of product sourced in the form of US Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule (HTS) codes. The first two digits describe the main category while additional 
digits refine the categorization. I use a count of the two digit code instead of a count of 
the four, six, or eight digit code as this provides the best measure of product variety. The 
four, six, or eight digit code counts emphasize within category variation at the expense of 
cross category variation.  
To measure the size of a buyer’s supplier network in a given year (Buyer Total 
Suppliers), to examine hypothesis four, I count all the suppliers that shipped to a given 
buyer per year. Finally, for hypothesis five, I calculate every buyer’s total orders in 
$ millions per year (Buyer Total Orders).  
2.3.3 Controls 
As controls, this investigation uses the average price per unit of the order21 (Price), 
and the total size of the order, in thousands of dollars (Order Size). I also include 
                                                 
21 An order’s price per unit was calculated by taking the average price per unit of each 
sub-line item on that order and weighting it by the dollar volume of that order. Prices in 
currencies other than US dollars were converted using annual exchange rates from 
www.oanda.com 
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measures of GDP (GDP) and GDP per capita (GDPpc) from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (World Bank 2011) in my regressions to ensure that contracting 
institutions are not proxying for a country’s overall level of economic development. 
The descriptive statistics for these variables and controls are presented in Table 
2.4, and the correlations between them are presented in Table 2.5. 
Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics 
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2.4 Empirical Analysis 
The primary goal of this investigation is to examine whether buyers choose MNC 
suppliers over local suppliers as a strategy to overcome weak institutions. Figure 2.1 
shows the share of orders allocated to local suppliers as a percentage of all orders plotted 
against Contract Viability (where higher values indicate stronger contract enforcement). 
The size of each bubble indicates the total volume of orders in that country. Figure 2.2 
shows a similar graph except plotted against Property Rights (again, higher values 
indicate stronger contract and property rights enforcement). In both of these graphs we 
can discern a pattern of orders predominantly allocated to MNC suppliers when 
institutions are weak and allocated to local suppliers when institutions are strong. 
Figure 2.1: Share of Orders to Local Suppliers vs. Strength of Contracting 
Institutions (Contract Viability), 2007-2009 
 
Note: Bubble size indicates total orders per country 
 
   66
Figure 2.2: Share of Orders to Local Suppliers vs. Strength of Contracting 
Institutions (Property Rights), 2007-2009 
 
Note: Bubble size indicates total orders per country 
 
2.4.1 Means Comparisons 
I next conduct a series of t-tests, whose results are shown in Table 2.6. For the 
first t-test I divide the countries in my sample into high vs. low Contract Viability groups 
based on the median country Contract Viability score. I then compare the average use of 
a MNC supplier per order for all orders going to the two groups of countries. The results 
indicate that usage of MNC suppliers is higher in strong contract enforcement institutions. 
However, this test gives us a faulty understanding of the relationship between the choice 
of MNC suppliers and the local contract environment. By categorizing orders based on 
the median country Contract Viability score, few observations are allocated to the high 
enforcement group, and the majority of these orders are sourced from Singapore and 
Taiwan, which are the headquarters countries for many MNC suppliers. Consequently, it 
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is not that buyers are choosing MNC suppliers over local suppliers in these countries, but 
that local-only suppliers are relatively scarce. In my next test I divide countries by the 
median Property Rights score and allocate orders to the two groups. Here I find that the 
use of MNC suppliers is significantly higher amongst countries with weak contract 
enforcement. A large reason for this is that, using Property Rights, orders from Mexico 
are included among the strong enforcement countries, unlike when using Contract 
Viability, and Mexico is both a large source of orders and a country where local suppliers 
are frequently used.  
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Table 2.6: T-tests 
 
I also conduct a series of t-tests allocating orders according to the characteristics 
of the buyer, to get a first glimpse as to whether MNC or local suppliers are chosen 
depending on these characteristics. I first allocate orders based on the number of 2 digit 
HTS categories (HTS02 Count) the buyer orders products in. Buyers were separated into 
two groups based on the median number of HTS categories a buyer sourced,22 and orders 
were correspondingly allocated between the two groups. Comparing the average use of 
                                                 
22 The median HTS02 Count, like the median Country Experience, Buyer Supplier 
Network, and Total Orders were calculated based on the average of these values, per 
buyer across the years 2007-2009. 
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MNC suppliers on orders in the group with many product categories with the group with 
few, I see that MNC suppliers were overwhelmingly used (68% of the time vs. 15%) on 
orders by buyers who sourced many categories of products. 
Next I divide buyers, and their corresponding orders, by the median amount of 
Country Experience and find that the average use of a MNC supplier was significantly 
higher in the group where Country Experience was low.  
When I allocate orders based on the size of a buyer’s supplier network (Suppliers) 
we see that the average use of an MNC supplier was significantly higher in the group 
with a larger supplier network than in the group with the smaller network. Finally, when I 
divide buyers and their orders by the median amount of Total Orders, I find that the 
average use of a MNC supplier was significantly higher when in the group where Total 
Orders was high, i.e. large buyers tend to use MNC suppliers more frequently.  
2.4.2 Regressions 
To conduct a much more in-depth investigation into the way in which the 
contracting environment and the characteristics of the buyer affect the choice of using a 
MNC or local supplier I conduct a series of logistic regressions using the following 
model. 
ܯܰܥ݂݈ܽ݃௜
ൌ ݂ሺߚଵܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௖௧ ൅ ߚଶܪܶܵ02ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ௕௧ ൅ ߚଷܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௖௕௧ ൅ ߚସܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௕௧
൅ ߚହܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௕௧ ൅ ߚ଺ܩܦ ௖ܲ௧ ൅ ߚ଻ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଼ܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߞ஻ ൅ ߠ௖ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߴ௣ ൅ ߝ௜ሻ 
Here ܯܰܥ݂݈ܽ݃௜ reflects whether a MNC or local supplier was used on order i. 
ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௖௧ measures the contract enforcement in country c in year t. ܪܶܵ02ܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ௕௧ 
is a count of the number of product categories (as defined by the 2 digit HTS codes) the 
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buyer b sourced in year t.	ܧݔ݌݁ݎ݅݁݊ܿ݁௖௕௧ measures the number of years since 2007 the 
buyer b has sourced from country c by year t. ܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௕௧ measures the number of 
suppliers b sources from in year t. ܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௕௧ is the total dollar volume of orders b sourced 
in year t. ܩܦ ௖ܲ௧ measures either GDP or GDP per capita in country c at t. ܲݎ݅ܿ݁௜ and 
ܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ are controls for the price per unit and total dollar value of the order i. ߞ஻,	ߠ௖, 
ߟ௧, and 	ߴ௣ are sets of dummy variables corresponding to buyer, country, year, and 
product category fixed effects. ߝ௜ is the error term. 
I begin by regressing MNC Flag on Contract Viability and Property Rights to see 
whether a buyer was more likely to give an order to a local or a MNC supplier subject to 
the institutional environment. The results of these regressions are in regressions (ii) in 
Table 2.7 and in Table 2.8. These regressions include controls for Price and Order Size, 
and also include buyer, year, country of origin, and product (at the 4 digit HTS code 
level) fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the product level and all coefficient 
estimates are presented as odds ratios. I find that a MNC supplier is less likely to be 
chosen when contracting institutions are strong (high values of Contract Viability or 
Property Rights). A one point increase in Contract Viability (stronger institutions) make 
it 2.3 times23 less likely that a MNC supplier was chosen. A one point increase in 
Property Rights (stronger institutions) make it 1.6 times less likely that a MNC supplier 
was chosen. Interestingly, neither Price nor Order Size have any explanatory power in 
the choice of whether a MNC or local supplier was used. 
                                                 
23 1/0.427 
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Table 2.7: Logit of MNC Flag on Contract Viability and Capabilities 
 
 
Table 2.8: Logit of MNC Flag on Property Rights and Capabilities 
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The second goal of the analysis is to investigate whether buyers choose MNC 
suppliers because of the capabilities of the supplier, i.e. the buyer has characteristics that 
make the supplier’s capabilities particularly attractive. The capabilities I am focusing on 
are the ability to supply multiple types of products, the knowledge of operating in a 
country that comes with experience operating in that country, having access to a large 
supplier network, and the ability to get economies of scale. In regressions (iii) in Tables 
2.7 and 2.8 we see that buyers are more likely to choose a MNC supplier when the buyer 
sources many different types of products (high Buyer HTS02 Count). Every additional 2 
digit HTS category that a buyer sources makes it 1.1 and 1.2 times respectively more 
likely that the buyer will choose a MNC supplier. I interpret this to suggest that buyers 
who need to source multiple products value MNC suppliers because MNC suppliers on 
average can supply a greater variety of products.24  
In regressions (iv) in both tables we find that buyers are less likely to use a MNC 
supplier when the buyer has more prior experience sourcing from the country. With each 
additional year the buyer is 2.3 and 2.5 times,25 respectively, more likely to source from a 
local supplier. 
Buyers are also less likely to use MNC suppliers when they have a large supplier 
network (high Buyer Total Suppliers). In regressions (v) we see that for every 10 
                                                 
24 In this sample, the average local only supplier supplied orders in 1.26 2-digit HTS 
categories. The average MNC supplier supplied 1.6 categories. A t-test of these means 
found them to be significantly different (t=-5.14) 
25 1/0.426 and 1/0.394 
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additional supplier’s in a buyer’s sourcing network the buyer is 1.2 times26 less likely to 
source from a MNC supplier. 
The effect when a buyer has larger total sourcing (high Buyer Total Orders), is 
less clear. In regression (vi) in Table 2.7, the coefficient is insignificant. However, the 
coefficient in the same regression in Table 2.8 is significant and implies that a buyer is 
1.01 times27 less likely to source from a MNC supplier for every additional million 
dollars worth of sourcing it does that year.  
Noticeably, the coefficient estimates on all of these variables remain roughly on 
the same order of magnitude throughout these regressions. A one point improvement in 
contracting institutions as measured by Contract Viability, leads to a between 1.8 and 2.6 
times lower likelihood of choosing a MNC supplier. Sourcing an additional product 
category (one point increase in Buyer HTS02 Count) makes it roughly 20% more likely 
that a MNC supplier will be chosen in all of the regressions. An extra year’s worth of 
experience sourcing from a given country make it between 2.3 and 3.3 times less likely 
that a MNC supplier will be chosen. Having an additional ten suppliers in one’s supplier 
network (Buyer Total Suppliers higher by ten) decreases the likelihood of choosing a 
MNC supplier by 15-26%. 
2.4.3 Renting Stronger Contracting Institutions 
To further investigate whether MNC suppliers are able to rent the stronger 
contract enforcement institutions of other countries they operate in, I next conduct 
regressions using the Strong MNC dependent variable. This variable measures whether a 
                                                 
26 (1/0.98)^10 
27 1/0.994 
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supplier operates in at least one above median contract enforcement country.28 Here I 
limit the sample to countries with weak contract enforcement institutions as measured 
either by below median country Contract Viability and Property Rights respectively, and 
I regress the level of Contract Viability and Property Rights on whether a Strong MNC 
supplier was used or not.29 The results, presented in Table 2.9 show that, a MNC with 
operations in a strong enforcement country is much more likely to be chosen in countries 
with worse contract enforcement institutions. In the sample created using the Contract 
Viability threshold, a one point increase in Contract Viability made it 2.4 times30 less 
likely that a MNC with operations in a strong country would be used. In the Low 
Property Rights sample a one point increase in Property Rights made it 1.2 times31 less 
likely that a strong country MNC would be used.32  
                                                 
28 The Strong MNC variable is calculated separately for each sample based on whether 
Contract Viability or Property Rights was being evaluated 
29 I exclude countries with above median institutions because all suppliers operating in 
these countries are categorized as strong country suppliers by the definition of this 
variable. 
30 1/0.414 
31 1/0.819 
32 Note: country fixed effects are not included in these regressions because, with the 
smaller sample of orders and countries there is insufficient variation in contract 
enforcement institutions within each country over this time period.  
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Table 2.9: Logit of Strong MNC on Contract Viability, Property Rights in Weak 
Institution Countries 
 
 
2.5 Robustness 
A particular concern when examining the importance of national institutions is 
that the institution under examination is correlated with various other factors, e.g. level of 
development or culture, that in turn affect the dependent variable. By including country 
level fixed effects, much of this is controlled for as my results are driven by the change in 
country institutions over the time period. However, we still have the problem that country 
institutions tend to change simultaneously and are thus correlated. It could be that buyers 
are choosing whether to use MNC or local suppliers based on other institutions that 
happen to be changing at the same time as the contracting institutions. To make sure my 
contracting institutions are not merely proxying for a country’s level of development I 
rerun my full model in Table 2.7 and Table 2.8 including GDP and GDP per capita. The 
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results are in Table 2.10. Except for the coefficient on Buyer Total Orders, which now 
becomes significant to the 5% level in regressions including Contract Viability and 
GDPpc, neither significance, direction or magnitude are substantially changed.  
Table 2.10: Logit of MNC Flag on Contracting Institutions, Capabilities, and GDP 
 
To ensure that contracting institutions are the most relevant institutions for 
understanding whether a MNC or local supplier is chosen I conduct a series of 
regressions using Contract Viability, Property Rights, and other relevant institutional 
indices from the ICRG and the Heritage Foundation. From the ICRG I selected 
Repatriation (the extent to which “profits can be transferred out of the host country”33), 
                                                 
33 The PRS Group, “Guide to Data Variables” (accessed February 2011) 
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Payment Delays (“factors affecting the timeliness or delays in payments to those 
exporting to the country” 34), Corruption (“A measure of corruption within the political 
system that is a threat to foreign investment” 35), Bureaucratic Quality (the “institutional 
strength and quality of the bureaucracy” 36), and Law & Order (the “strength and 
impartiality of the legal system”, and the “popular observance of the law” 37). From the 
Heritage Foundation indices, I chose Business Freedom (a “measure of the ability to start, 
operate, and close a business”38), Trade Freedom (a “measure of the absence of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers”39), Investment Freedom (“a variety of restrictions typically imposed 
on investment”40), Financial Freedom (“a measure of banking efficiency as well as a 
measure of independence from government control and interference in the financial 
sector”41), and Freedom from Corruption (“a 10-point scale in which a score of 10 
indicates very little corruption and a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt government”42). 
Almost all of these variables are highly correlated (see Table 2.11 for correlations) and 
thus I orthogonalize them for use in this investigation.  The results of regressing MNC 
Flag on the orthogonalized ICRG variables are presented in Table 2.12, while the results 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 http://www.heritage.org/index/business-freedom (accessed 4/18/2012) 
39 http://www.heritage.org/index/trade-freedom (accessed 4/18/2012) 
40 http://www.heritage.org/index/investment-freedom (accessed 4/18/2012) 
41 http://www.heritage.org/index/financial-freedom (accessed 4/18/2012) 
42 http://www.heritage.org/index/freedom-from-corruption (accessed 4/18/2012) 
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of regressing MNC Flag on the orthogonalized Heritage Foundation indices are presented 
in Table 2.13. In the first table we see that Contract Viability, Repatriation, Payment 
Delays, and Burequcratic Quality are all significant and imply that stronger institutions 
make it less likely that a MNC supplier will be chosen for a given order. However, the 
coefficient on Contract Viability is much smaller than any of the other variables, 
implying that contracting institutions are particularly relevant to the choice of supplier 
type. In the second of these tables we see that, out of the selected Heritage Foundation 
indices, only Property Rights is significant. I interpret these results as evidence that 
contracting institutions are particularly important when buyers choose which MNCs they 
source from. 
   79
Table 2.11: Correlations Between Institutional Indices and GDP 
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Table 2.12: Logit of MNC Flag on Orthogonalized Institutions, ICRG 
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Table 2.13: Logit of MNC Flag on Orthogonalized Institutions, Heritage Foundation  
 
It is also possible that MNC suppliers are being chosen for other potential reasons 
that happen to be correlated with the contracting environment. Buyers may, for example, 
be preferring to use MNC suppliers in countries with particularly weak infrastructure, or 
where crime is particularly high. They may even be choosing to use MNC suppliers in 
countries with particularly low wages to avoid accusations of exploitive labor practices. 
To examine the importance of physical infrastructure on the choice of supplier type I 
include data on the quality of port infrastructure (Ports) from the World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2011). This metric was chosen because it is both highly relevant 
to the kinds of transactions in my data, and because it is the most complete series 
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measuring infrastructure, in terms of countries and my time frame, available. To proxy 
for crime I use the number of homicides per 100,000 population (Homicide) from the UN 
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2011), and to account for wages I use nominal 
average wages from the International Labour Organization’s Key Indicators of the 
Labour Market (ILO 2011). The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2.14 and 
Table 2.15 and include Contract Viability and Property Rights respectively. In regression 
(ii) in both tables we see that port infrastructure is highly significant and implies that 
buyers are much more likely to source from MNC suppliers in countries where port 
infrastructure is weak. In regressions (iii) and (iv) in both tables we see that neither wages 
nor the homicide rate are statistically significant. The results concerning contracting 
institutions and the number of different types of products a buyer sources stay consistent 
with the previous regressions while the results regarding a buyer’s experience sourcing 
from the country in question, the buyer’s total number of suppliers and total orders 
fluctuate substantially with the inclusion of either Wages or Homicide. I attribute part of 
this to the smaller sample for which data is available. 
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Table 2.14: Logit of MNC Flag on Contract Viability, Capabilities, and Additional 
Variables 
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Table 2.15: Logit of MNC Flag on Property Rights, Capabilities, and Additional 
Variables 
 
An additional concern is that, since the capabilities related variables are strongly 
linked to the buyer, standard errors should be clustered at the level of the buyer. To 
address this I rerun my regressions including the buyer related variables and clustering at 
the level of the buyer. The results, presented in Table 2.16, show that while significance 
is reduced for some variables (Buyer HTS02 Count is now significant only at the 15% 
level in both regressions), for the most part the results remain the same in terms of 
significance, magnitude, and direction. 
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Table 2.16: Logit of MNC on Capabilities, Errors Clustered by Buyer 
 
Finally, we may be worried that buyers are predominantly choosing whether to 
use MNC or local suppliers based on how far the host country is from the buyer’s 
headquarters (located in the US for the vast majority of buyers in my sample) and that 
some of these variables may be correlated with this distance. To account for the 
importance of distance, I include data from the CEPII (Mayer and Zignago 2011) on 
distance in thousands of miles between the host country and the US in Tables 2.17 and 
2.18. However, as the distance between countries does not change from year to year, I 
cannot include country fixed effects in these regressions.  
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Table 2.17: Logit of MNC Flag on Contract Viability and Distance to the US 
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Table 2.18: Logit of MNC Flag on Property Rights and Distance to the US 
 
In all of these regressions we see that distance to the US is a highly significant 
predictor of whether a MNC supplier is used. An additional one thousand mile distance 
from the US corresponds to it being 1.08 to 1.11 times more likely that a MNC supplier 
was used. However, the vast majority of the other variables remain similar in terms of 
significance and direction, though the magnitude of most are reduced and the significance 
of some are lessened. In regressions ii to vi in Table 2.17 we see that Contract Viability 
falls from being significant at the 1% level to being, in most cases significant at the 5% 
level. Also, whereas previously a one point increase in Contract Viability made it 2.3 
times less likely that a MNC supplier was chosen, in Table 2.17 the regressions suggest 
that a one point increase makes it 1.4 to 1.6 times less likely. In Table 2.18 we see that 
Property Rights remains significant at the 1% level, but its magnitude is decreased. Now 
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a ten point increase in Property Rights corresponds to it being 1.5 times less likely that a 
MNC supplier is chosen. In the case of HTS02 Count, significance is reduced from the 
1% level to 5% and 10% level and it loses significance entirely in regressions vi in both 
Tables 2.17 and 2.18. Also its magnitude is reduced. The same is true of Total Suppliers. 
Total Orders remains the same in terms of significance and magnitude. The largest 
surprise in these regressions is the coefficient on Country Experience. The direction of 
this variable flips and becomes significant at the 1% level in all cases. This coefficient 
now implies that every additional year’s worth of experience that the buyer has sourcing 
from the local country makes it 5.5-5.7 times more likely that a MNC supplier is chosen. 
This result is driven by the removal of country fixed effects because the orders in my 
sample are concentrated in countries where buyers heavily source from MNC suppliers 
and have been sourcing from these suppliers for a longer period of time. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I set out to examine whether buyers are using MNC suppliers as a 
means of overcoming weak contracting institutions or whether they are using MNC 
suppliers for their capabilities in coordinating production, their knowledge of the host 
country business environment, their ability to manage supplier networks, or for gaining 
economies of scale. My analysis suggests they are doing all of the above. I find that 
buyers are much more likely to choose MNC suppliers in countries with weak institution 
or poor infrastructure, and are more likely to use MNC suppliers when they need to 
source many different types of products, have little host country experience, have small 
supplier networks, and have small total ordering volumes.  
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This research would be enhanced with more granular data on MNC supplier 
activities and capabilities, and many more investigations of MNC supplier activities are 
possible using the data in this paper. It would be interesting to extend the time horizon of 
this data which would allow us to investigate how suppliers expand their operations from 
one country to the next. Alternatively, one could augment the data with information on 
local competitive environments, supplier operations, and capabilities, to better understand 
their areas of competitive advantage, or gather more data on buyer activities to 
understand how and when MNC suppliers take over these activities. It would be equally 
fascinating to look beyond the industries in this dataset to more capital or research 
intensive industries to see how MNC suppliers use their reach to tap into resources and 
capabilities abroad. MNC suppliers are an increasingly visible component of international 
trade and their importance is only likely to continue to grow as firms in developed 
countries outsource ever more activities. 
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The Effect of Credit Markets, Financial Institutions, and Market 
Power on Trade Credit Terms in International Contract 
Manufacturing During the Financial Crisis 
3.1 Introduction 
Trade credit is increasingly being recognized as an important determinant of trade. 
Studies have found that trade credit made up 15% of non-farm, non-financial liabilities in 
the US (Elliehausen and Wolken 1993) and 15-30% of firm assets in the G7 countries 
(Rajan and Zingales 1995). Trade credit has been found to be the single most important 
source of short-term external finance for US firms (Petersen and Rajan 1997), accounted 
for 2.5 times the value of all new public debt and equity issues in the US during the 
1990s (Ng, Smith and Smith 1999), and was the most important source of financial 
intermediation for small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in countries with 
weak financial institutions (Fabbri and Klapper 2008). The importance of trade credit for 
international trade is large enough that the dramatic drop in international trade following 
the financial crisis is often attributed to the precipitous decline in the provision of trade 
credit (Auboin 2009, IMF 2009, Ahn 2010).  
Despite the importance of trade credit, remarkably little is certain about the 
determinants of trade credit. Scholars have posited three major categories of factors that 
affect a supplier’s willingness to extend trade credit: i) the supplier’s access to credit and 
local financial institutions and capital markets (Petersen and Rajan 1997, Burkart and 
Ellingsen 2004, Cunat 2007), ii) the buyer’s creditworthiness (Ng, Smith and Smith 1999, 
McMillan and Woodruff 1999, Johnson et al. 2002, Antras and Foley 2011), and iii) 
market power between the buyer and the supplier (Wilner 2000, Fabbri and Klapper 2008, 
Giannetti et al. 2011). However, the evidence put forward to verify the importance of 
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these determinants has been lacking due to the paucity of trade credit data. Most papers 
on trade credit have relied on cross sectional data on firm accounts payable and 
receivable in the National Survey of Small Businesses Finances (NSSBF), or have used 
surveys conducted in individual emerging or transition countries. Almost none of these 
have been able to study transaction level data, any cross border trade, or how trade credit 
changes over time. A notable exception to this is Antras and Foley (2011), which 
demonstrated the importance of buyer credit worthiness and relational contracting 
(category ii) in determining the provision of trade credit, using transactions of a supplier 
and its buyers across 140 countries. 
This study complements Antras and Foley (2011) by analyzing the role of local 
supplier financial institutions and credit markets, and market power considerations on the 
provision of trade credit. I am able to conduct this analysis thanks to a unique dataset of 
international contract manufacturing purchase orders worth $13.8bn from 22 large 
predominantly US based buyers and their 1203 suppliers across 47 countries from 2007 
to 2009. To my knowledge this is the most extensive, detailed data on trade credit that 
has been analyzed and the first time trade credit data from multiple buyers and sellers, 
and across multiple countries and years, has been available for analysis. A particularly 
helpful, unique feature of this data is the information on every order’s payment tenor – 
the number of days between delivery of goods and payment – that provides an unusually 
nuanced measure of the degree of trade credit between parties.43  
Using this data, I find that local credit markets and buyer market power, as 
measured by the size of the buyer’s local supplier network, significantly influence the 
                                                 
43 Prior studies have focused on whether trade credit was provided or whether discounts 
were offered for early payment – which typically vary very little by buyer 
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length of trade credit terms (payment tenor) a supplier is willing to extend to a buyer. I 
also use the financial crisis as a quasi-natural experiment to show that payment tenor 
increased in response to the financial crisis. The change in payment tenor as a response to 
the financial crisis is economically substantial implying an increase in payment tenor 
equivalent to a 7% increase in interest free lending from suppliers to buyers. However, 
suppliers in countries with shallow credit markets increased their trade credit terms less 
than suppliers in countries with stronger institutions and deeper credit markets. Similarly, 
buyers with larger local supplier networks prior to the crisis were able to extend their 
payment tenors more than buyers with smaller local networks. However, market power, 
as measured by a buyer’s total sourcing volumes was not significant in all of my analyses. 
My results on financial institutions are less clear, countries with strong credit registry 
coverage did have longer payment tenors and countries with weak credit bureau coverage 
did extend tenors less as a response to the crisis. However, countries with weak financial 
institutions as measured by the Heritage Foundation’s Financial Freedom index increased 
their payment terms substantially.  
This chapter is divided into seven sections. In Section 3.2 I review the literature 
on trade credit, institutions, and market power and derive my hypotheses. I describe my 
data in Section 3.3 and my methodology in Section 3.4. I present the results of my 
analysis in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 I conduct an extensive array of robustness checks. 
Finally, in Section 3.7, I discuss the results, their contributions and limitations, and 
directions for future research. 
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3.2 Theoretical Development 
The literature on trade credit comes out of a broader literature in international 
trade and international finance that has long noted the importance of credit markets and 
financial institutions for international trade. Kletzer and Bardhan (1987) noted that 
differences in credit contract enforcement led to differences in comparative advantage in 
industries that required working capital and trade finance between countries. Beck (2002) 
found that financial development increased exports by facilitating large-scale high-return 
projects, while Chor and Manova (2009) found that countries with higher inter-bank rates 
exported less to the US. Paravisini et al. (2011) found that, at the firm level, access to 
credit affected exports, using bank credit data from Peru. This literature has 
unambiguously demonstrated the importance of financial markets and institutions for 
international trade, but it has not been able to determine whether this impact is because 
financial markets affect a supplier’s ability to invest or provide trade credit. 
The recent attention on trade credit during the last two decades can be traced to 
the availability of data on accounts payable and receivable available for a large sample of 
small US firms through the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBR) and a 
host of studies that demonstrated the large economic significance of trade credit 
(Elliehausen and Wolken 1993, Rajan and Zingales 1995, Petersen and Rajan 1997, and 
Giannetti et al. 2011). The literature on trade credit can be broadly categorized as 
investigating the determinants of the provision of trade credit according to three main 
themes, i) the supplier’s local financial institutions and credit markets, ii) the buyer’s 
creditworthiness and the methods of enforcing payment, and iii) market power between 
the buyer and supplier. 
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3.2.1 Supplier Financial Institutions and Credit Markets 
Perersen and Rajan (1997), a founding study in the literature on trade credit, 
found that trade credit was used more frequently when credit from financial institutions 
was unavailable, but that, at the same time, firms with better access to credit offered more 
credit. Several models were later developed to explain why trade credit existed in the 
presence of banks and other specialized financial intermediaries. Burkart and Ellingsen 
(2004) created a model that, based on the notion that it is easier and more profitable to 
misappropriate cash than inputs, found that suppliers have an advantage over traditional 
financial institutions in providing buyers with credit, particularly in countries with weak 
credit markets. Cunat (2007) added to the notion that suppliers have an advantage in 
offering trade credit over banks, by being able to threaten to stop the supply of 
intermediate goods to the buyer in the future. 
3.2.2 Buyer Creditworthiness and Collecting Payment 
In contrast to this work which has emphasized credit availability as a determinant 
of the provision of trade credit, another stream of work looked at how trade credit was 
offered based on the buyer’s creditworthiness, product quality issues, and the supplier’s 
ability to use the courts to extract payment. Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) used US firm 
survey data to analyze the determinants of trade credit and found that terms varied 
according to issues of buyer creditworthiness (buyers with a good reputation got better 
terms) and product quality (established suppliers offered worse terms) and did not vary in 
response to market demand fluctuations. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) investigated the 
use of trade credit in Vietnam and found that it varied in response to the supplier’s ability 
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to gather information about the buyer and his ability to apply community sanctions to 
prevent buyers from defaulting.  
Papers in this vein have extended this analysis to look at the effect of contract 
enforcement institutions in determining firms’ willingness to extend credit. Johnson et al. 
(2002), surveyed firms in transition countries about the provision of trade credit and 
found that trade credit was more likely to be extended in countries with better courts, 
when the parties had a pre-existing relationship and when the supplier could obtain 
information about the buyer. Antras and Foley (2011) extended this work both 
theoretically – deriving predictions about the provision of trade credit from international 
trade models – and methodologically – using trade credit information from a large US 
supplier and its buyers in 140 countries. The paper found that buyers in weak contract 
enforcement institution countries and buyers who the supplier had not worked with 
previously were more frequently required to pay in advance for orders instead of being 
given trade credit. Further, during the financial crisis, the supplier was more likely to 
require cash in advance when working with new buyers. 
3.2.3 Market Power 
Another vein of this literature is the idea that buyers with market power can 
extract more trade credit from suppliers. This was first articulated in Wilner (2000) 
whose model found that a buyer could extract more concessions when renegotiating 
payment terms with a highly dependent supplier than with a less dependent one. Giannetti 
et al. (2011) looked at market power in the context of the NSSBF and found that larger 
firms in more concentrated industries received more credit, with longer payment tenors, 
and larger early payment discounts. Fabbri and Klapper (2008) looked at data from a 
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survey of 2500 Chinese SMEs and found that suppliers with less market power, as 
measured by whether they were the largest supplier to that buyer, were more likely to 
extend credit. They also found that neither access to bank funding, nor profitability 
determined whether a supplier was more likely to provide trade credit. Both papers found 
that trade credit was relatively cheap. In the Chinese context, trade credit was cheaper 
than bank loans in 10% of cases and in the US a majority of US firms received cheap 
trade credit. 
By looking at this literature we see that, while many factors that affect the 
provision of trade credit have been proposed, there are many areas that remain poorly 
understood or have not been adequately investigated, largely because of the limitations of 
the data that has been available. A particularly large gap in this literature is our 
understanding of the provision of trade credit in the context of international trade. While 
Antras and Foley (2011), demonstrated that issues of buyer creditworthiness and local 
contract enforcement do affect the provision of credit in the context of cross-border 
transactions, none of the studies that look at the role of financial institutions nor market 
power look at cross-border trade. All of the studies that have looked at access to credit 
markets were limited to examining each country individually and thus we do not know 
how important variations in credit markets and financial institutions are for cross border 
trade credit. Given the important role that trade credit is widely believed to have in 
international trade, these are particularly interesting areas which I will investigate in this 
chapter.  
Another problem with most of these investigations is that they use cross sectional 
data and thus there are susceptible to a host of issues related to omitted variable bias, 
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endogeneity and reverse causality. Firms that have better access to credit may also have 
many other common characteristics that may explain their willingness to extend credit.44 
Suppliers in different countries may have common national characteristics that may 
happen to be correlated with the institution being measured.45 In the case of market 
power, it is particularly likely that firm size and industry concentration will be correlated 
with performance measures, such as productivity, and thus the relationship between 
market power and trade credit may be spurious.  
Consequently, in this chapter I will try and address these gaps in the literature by 
using a unique set of international contract manufacturing purchase orders that track all 
of the purchases of 22 large, predominantly US buyers and their suppliers around the 
globe covering the period just before and after the recent financial crisis. In particular, I 
will be investigating i) the role that credit markets and financial institutions played in 
enabling suppliers to offer longer trade credit terms, ii) the role that market power played 
in allowing buyers to extract longer credit terms, and iii) how payment tenor changed in 
response to the financial crisis and the degree to which this can be explained by market 
power, financial institutions, and local credit markets. This data is uniquely well suited 
for this investigation because there is significant variation in credit markets and financial 
institutions and because it captures the entire supplier networks of these buyers allowing 
me to control for time-invariant characteristics of the buyer, supplier, and the country. 
                                                 
44 For example, firms that offer more trade credit could perform better and thus be better 
able to access credit. 
45 For example, the strength of many institutions is correlated with overall economic 
development. 
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3.2.4 Hypotheses 
As noted earlier, many papers in the international trade literature have found that 
stronger financial markets and institutions affect trade by increasing exports. One 
mechanism through which this occurs is that financial markets and institutions provide 
funding for investment. However, credit markets and financial institutions can also 
greatly assist in the provision of trade credit. Providing trade credit is effectively an 
unsecured, interest free loan from the supplier to the buyer for the payment tenor, i.e. 
duration between delivery of the goods and payment, and suppliers can support 
themselves in the intervening period using retained earnings or by accessing external 
financing. In countries with deeper credit markets, capital is more likely to be cheaply 
available. Countries with financial institutions that provide credit information (credit 
registries or bureaus) are also likely to offer cheaper external financing by reducing the 
credit risk to the lender. Similarly, countries with financial institutions that protect 
creditors are likely to offer cheaper external financing. Consequently, we would expect 
that suppliers in countries with deeper credit markets and stronger financial institutions 
would be better able to offer trade credit, and would offer longer payment tenors than 
suppliers in countries with thin credit markets and weak financial institutions. 
Hypothesis 1: Suppliers in countries with deep credit markets and strong 
financial institutions are more likely to have longer payment tenors on their orders. 
The literature on trade credit has also given us clear expectations about the role of 
market power in determining trade credit and the length of payment tenor. Fabbri and 
Klapper (2008) and Giannetti et al. (2011) found that larger buyers with more suppliers 
used trade credit more intensively than buyers that did not. Thus, in my data I expect that 
larger buyers will be able to negotiate longer payment tenor. Similarly, buyers with larger 
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networks of suppliers are expected to extract longer payment tenors because they are able 
to shift orders to their suppliers that agree to longer payment tenors from suppliers that do 
not. 
Hypothesis 2: Larger buyers, and buyers with more suppliers, will on average 
negotiate longer payment tenors than smaller buyers or buyers with smaller supplier 
networks. 
The financial crisis dramatically reduced demand in many industries, reducing 
order volumes and the need to source from as many suppliers. In my sample orders fell 
from 366,805 purchase orders before the crisis, worth $8.7bn to 294,140 orders, worth 
$5.1bn, after the crisis had begun. With the decrease in demand, buyers would have had 
stronger market power over their suppliers for several reasons. Firstly, overall demand 
would have been reduced so suppliers would have fewer alternative buyers. Secondly, in 
many cases buyers would have needed fewer suppliers given the lack of demand. Buyers 
could thus make credible threats to only source from suppliers who offered longer terms. 
Thirdly, buyers would have had a larger number of suppliers to choose from as other 
buyers stopped sourcing from their suppliers. We would thus hypothesize that payment 
tenor increased following the financial crisis as almost all buyers experienced an increase 
in market power.  
Hypothesis 3: Average payment tenors increased following the financial crisis as 
a result of the general increase in buyer market power. 
We might further hypothesize that buyers who had more suppliers and larger 
orders prior to the crisis would be particularly able to exert power over suppliers once the 
crisis started, relative to buyers with smaller total orders and smaller supplier networks. 
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Hypothesis 4: Buyers with larger orders and supplier networks prior to the 
financial crisis were able to extend the payment tenor on their orders longer than buyers 
with fewer orders and fewer suppliers. 
However, the credit markets and financial institutions would have strongly 
affected the ability of suppliers to extend payment tenors to meet the demands of these 
buyers. On average we would expect supplier cash reserves to have been lessened or 
depleted during the financial crisis as orders fell and fixed costs were spread over fewer 
orders. Thus we would expect that external financing became very important during the 
financial crisis in order for suppliers to lengthen payment tenors. However, suppliers in 
countries with weak financial institutions and underdeveloped credit markets would have 
been at a significant disadvantage relative to suppliers in countries with developed 
markets that could provide financing, and at cheaper rates. Also, weak financial 
institutions, such as institutions that provide information about creditworthiness, would 
have made it difficult, or impossible, to access international financial markets, 
particularly for small suppliers. Consequently, we would expect that suppliers in 
countries with weak financial institutions and shallow local credit markets would be less 
able to lengthen their trade credit terms. 
Hypothesis 5: Suppliers in countries with deep credit markets and strong 
financial institutions on average lengthened payment tenor on their orders more than 
suppliers in countries with shallow markets and weak institutions. 
3.3 Data 
International contracting manufacturing is an excellent context to study trade 
credit because a buyer usually sources from a network of suppliers and repeatedly 
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sources from each supplier. Further, this network often spans multiple countries with 
substantial variation in the institutional environment in each. Unfortunately, collecting 
this data is difficult because, in most cases, companies fiercely guard the identities of 
their suppliers as well as information about order volumes, prices, and trade credit terms, 
as this information would be very valuable to their competitors. The difficulties of 
collecting this data are multiplied with each additional company. 
To overcome these difficulties I worked with a provider of cloud-based software 
that manages and provides financing services for contract manufacturing purchase orders 
for many large global buyers. The buyers typically manage all of their sourcing via this 
software, and all information about their purchase orders, from ordering through 
shipment, and then invoicing and payment is transmitted and processed by the software. 
The data is exceptional in the level of detail it provides on orders that span multiple 
buyers with multiple suppliers across multiple countries. The purchase orders used in this 
investigation contained data on the buyer, supplier, country of origin (i.e. country in 
which the goods were last processed), price per unit, date the order was generated and 
latest shipping date, payment tenor, and customs classification. Unfortunately, many 
buyers using the software do not record the country of origin (i.e. the last country in 
which the good was substantially processed before being delivered to the buyer) of the 
goods on their purchase orders, and thus these buyers can not be included in my study as 
I can not identify the relevant institutions. Further, four buyers did not record the 
payment tenor on their orders when the orders were generated and thus their orders were 
dropped from my sample. 
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For this investigation I analyzed all of the orders between 22 large, predominantly 
US-based buyers and their 1203 suppliers across 47 countries. The buyers operate in a 
range of industries and own some of the most famous global brands in their fields.46 
There were 633,184 orders, worth $13.6 billion, between these buyers and their suppliers 
between 2007-2009 and this sample represents all, or nearly all, of the orders by these 
buyers worldwide. Almost all of the buyers have no manufacturing of their own and fully 
outsource production. The buyers were substantially affected by the financial crisis with 
orders dropping from $8.6bn before September 15th, 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed 
for bankruptcy to $5bn afterwards.  
I combined this data on contract manufacturing orders with information on credit 
market depth and financial institutions from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (World Bank 2011) and the Heritage Foundation (Heritage Foundation 2011).  
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Payment Tenor: Each order in the sample contained information on when 
payment was to be made by the buyer to the seller in the form of the number of days 
between a specified event and when the supplier would be paid. These events were 
typically an incoterm, e.g. Free On Board (i.e. from the date the goods are delivered to 
the port of shipment) or the presentation of shipping documents. In a minority of cases 
the event was the authorization of payment or the presentation of the invoice. Almost all 
buyers designated only one type of event in all of their orders. The variable Payment 
Tenor captures the number of days, on each order, between the event and when the 
                                                 
46 The names of the buyers are not disclosed as part of the confidentiality agreement with 
the cloud-based software company, and every attempt has been made to disguise their 
identity. 
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supplier was to be paid. In my sample, Payment Tenor varied from 0 days, i.e. payment 
on delivery, to 120 days, and was, on average 32 days. 
3.3.2 Independent Variables 
DCBS: This variable is the domestic credit provided by the banking sector 
(DCBS), as a share of GDP, in the country where the goods were originally shipped from. 
Countries where a lot of domestic credit is provided by the banking sector typically have 
deeper credit markets than countries where a smaller amount of domestic credit is 
provided by the banking sector. (See Figure 3.1 for the distribution of DCBS and other 
credit market and financial institution metrics by country in this sample.) 
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of Countries by Institution 
 
 
 
 
Note: Observations are at the level of country-year, 147 observations in total. The median 
value of DCBS is 68.4, DCPS is 60.4, PCRC is 1.3, PCBC 28.4, CDII is 5, NDC is 
$101bn, and Financial Freedom is 50. 
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Low DCBS: I ranked the 47 countries in this sample by their average DCBS value 
across years. All countries below the median were assigned a Low DCBS value of one. 
Countries at or above the median were given a Low DCBS value of zero.  
DCPS: I also try to measure the depth of domestic credit markets by looking at 
the amount of domestic credit going to the private sector (DCPS), as a share of GDP, in 
the country where the goods were originally shipped from. DCPS “refers to financial 
resources provided to the private sector, such as through loans, purchases of nonequity 
securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable”.47 I use DCPS as an 
alternative measure of the depth of the local financial markets because, in countries with 
low DCPS, credit is not flowing to private sector firms. 
Low DCPS: As with Low DCBS, the 47 countries were ranked by their average 
DCPS value across years, and countries below the median were assigned a Low DCPS of 
one, while countries at or above the median were assigned a Low DCPS of zero.  
NDC: The final way I measure the depth of local credit markets is to look at the 
country’s net domestic credit. This variable measures the “the sum of net credit to the 
nonfinancial public sector, credit to the private sector, and other accounts”.48 I convert 
this variable, originally in local currency units into US dollars using yearly exchange 
rates from www.oanda.com.  
Low NDC: Like all of the variables in this study with the prefix “Low”, this 
variable ranks countries by the average value of variable in question, Net Domestic 
                                                 
47 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (accessed3/30/2012) 
48 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FM.AST.DOMS.CN 
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Credit, across years and assigns each order a one if the order came from a country that 
had a value less than the median country and zero otherwise. 
PCRC: This variable seeks to measure the availability of credit information in a 
given country and is based on public credit registry coverage (PCRC) as a share of adults. 
PCRC “reports the number of individuals and firms listed in a public credit registry with 
current information on repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding.”49 A 
downside of using PCRC is that many developed countries do not have public credit 
registries. However, these countries account for a small fraction of orders.  
Low PCRC: I ranked each country by PCRC and countries with values below the 
median were assigned a Low PCRC of one, and countries at or above the median were 
assigned a Low PCRC of zero.  
PCBC: An alternative method of estimating the degree of credit information 
available is to look at private credit bureau coverage. This variable measures “the number 
of individuals or firms listed by a private credit bureau with current information on 
repayment history, unpaid debts, or credit outstanding” as a percentage of all adults. The 
disadvantage of using this variable is that private credit bureaus do not operate in many 
emerging markets.50 
Low PCBC: Indicates whether an order was sourced from a country whose PCBC 
was less than that of the median country. 
CDII: A final way in which I look at the financial institutions related to credit 
information is by using the World Development Indicator’s Credit Information index. 
                                                 
49 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.CRD.PUBL.ZS (accessed3/30/2012) 
50 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.CRD.PRVT.ZS 
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This index measures the “the scope, accessibility, and quality of credit information 
available through public or private credit registries”.51  
Low CDII: Indicates whether an order was sourced from a country whose CDII 
was less than that of the median country. 
Financial Freedom: As a final method to measure the strength of financial 
institutions in a country I also include the Heritage Foundation’s index of Financial 
Freedom. This index broadly measures “government regulation of financial services”, 
“state intervention in banks”, “financial and capital market development”, “government 
influence over the allocation of credit”, and “openness to foreign competition”. In my 
sample the index varies from 20, “The central bank is not independent, and its 
supervision of financial institutions is repressive” to 90, “regulation of financial 
institutions is minimal but may extend beyond enforcing contractual obligations and 
preventing fraud.”52 
Low Financial Freedom: Indicates whether an order was sourced from a country 
whose Financial Freedom value was less than that of the median country. 
Post Lehman: This variable indicates whether a purchase order was generated 
before or after the start of the financial crisis. If the order was generated on or before 
September 15th, 2008, the date on which Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, Post 
Lehman was set to zero. If the order was generated after September 15th, 2008, this 
variable was set to one. In this sample, 349,583 purchase orders were generated prior to 
Lehman’s collapse and 283,601 (45%) orders after. 
                                                 
51 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.CRD.INFO.XQ 
52 http://www.heritage.org/index/financial-freedom 
   108
Suppliers: This variable attempts to capture a buyer’s power over local supplier 
by measuring the number of suppliers a buyer sources from in a particular country in a 
given year. When interacted with Post Lehman I use the total number of suppliers a buyer 
had in a given country in the period before the financial crisis. 
Orders: This is my second measure that attempts to capture market power. Orders 
measures the total volume of orders, in millions of US dollars, a buyer sources from all of 
its suppliers in a given year. When interacted with Post Lehman, I still use the buyer’s 
total volume of orders in the current year (as opposed to in the period before Lehman’s 
financial crisis) to avoid collinearity with buyer or buyer*supplier*country fixed effects. 
3.3.3 Controls 
Order Size: This variable is the total dollar value, in thousands, of the given 
purchase order. Orders in currencies other than U.S. dollars were converted using annual 
average exchange rates.53 
GDPpc: GDP per capita, in current U.S. dollars from the World Development 
Indicators. 
3.4 Empirical Model 
My empirical analysis is conducted in two parts. In the first part I estimate the 
effect of financial markets, institutions, and market power on payment tenor length. In the 
second part I look at how the change in payment tenor days during the financial crisis 
was moderated by credit markets, institutions, and market power.  
                                                 
53 From www.oanda.com 
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In the first part I use linear regression to examine whether credit markets, 
institutions and market power had an affect on an order’s payment tenor. I use linear 
regression because interpreting the resulting coefficients is straightforward and better 
tools are available for clustering errors at multiple levels. However there is a risk that the 
coefficients are biased given the discrete nature of my dependent variable. I thus also 
conduct these regressions using a negative binomial regression model (see Section 3.6.1). 
The first model I estimate is: 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ	ܶ݁݊݋ݎ௜
ൌ ߚଵܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௖௧ ൅ ߚଶܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௕௖௧ ൅ ߚଷܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௕௧ ൅ ߚସܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߚହܩܦܲ݌ܿ௖௧
൅ ߞ௕ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ௖ߴ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Here, ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ	ܶ݁݊݋ݎ௜ is the number of days between delivery of the goods and 
the date the supplier will be paid54 stipulated on each purchase order i. ܫ݊ݏݐ݅ݐݑݐ݅݋݊௖௧ 
measures the strength of financial markets or institutions in country c in year t. 
ܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௕௖௧ counts the number of suppliers that buyer b sources from in country c in 
year t. ܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௕௧ measures the value of all orders by buyer b in year t. ܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ is the 
dollar value of the purchase order i and is a control together with ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௖௧, which reflects 
the GDP per capita in the original shipping country c in year t. ߞ௕, ߟ௬, and 	 ௖ߴ are sets of 
dummy variables corresponding to buyer firm, year, and country fixed effects. ߝ௜ is the 
error term. Table 3.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used for these 
regressions, while Table 3.2 shows the correlations between them. 
                                                 
54 More accurately, between the payment event and the time at which the supplier is paid. 
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Table 3.1: Part 1 Variables, Descriptive Statistics 
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In the second part I examine whether firms negotiated different payment tenors as 
a response to the financial crisis, and the role that local financial institutions, credit 
markets, and market power had on the changes to payment tenor. To do this I used linear 
regression to examine the impact of whether an order was placed before or after the crisis, 
and whether the order was placed in a country with weak credit markets or financial 
institutions, or with buyers who had market power, on the length of the payment tenor (in 
days) for that order. (See Section 3.6.1 for an estimation using a negative binomial 
regression model.) The model I estimate in this stage is thus: 
ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ	ܶ݁݊݋ݎ௜
ൌ ߚଵܲ݋ݏݐ	ܮ݄݁݉ܽ݊௜ ൅ ߚଶܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌௜ ൅ ߚଷܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௜ ൅ ߚସܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௜
൅ ߚହܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ ൅ ߚ଺ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௖௧ ൅ ߞ௕௦௖ ൅ ߝ௜ 
Again, ܲܽݕ݉݁݊ݐ	ܶ݁݊݋ݎ௜ is the number of days between delivery of the goods and 
the date the supplier was paid. ܲ݋ݏݐ	ܮ݄݁݉ܽ݊௜ is a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the order was placed after September 15th, 2008. ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܩݎ݋ݑ݌௜ indicates whether the 
order was placed after the crisis and in a country which had weak financial institutions or 
markets. ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܵݑ݌݌݈݅݁ݎݏ௜ indicates how many suppliers a buyer had in country c prior 
to Lehman’s bankruptcy, if the order i took place after the bankruptcy. Similarly, 
ܲ݋ݏݐ ∗ ܱݎ݀݁ݎݏ௜ indicates the size of a buyer’s total sourcing across all countries prior to 
the crisis, if order i was issued after Lehman’s bankruptcy. ܱݎ݀݁ݎܵ݅ݖ݁௜ is the dollar value 
of the purchase order i and is a control together with ܩܦܲ݌ܿ௖௧, which reflects the GDP 
per capita in the original shipping country c in year t. ߞ௕௦௖ is a dummy variable 
corresponding to a fixed effect for each buyer-supplier-country triad. ߝ௜ is the error term. 
Note that ܩݎ݋ݑ݌௜ is not included in this model because it is perfectly collinear with the 
   113
fixed effects. To see the effect of ܩݎ݋ݑ݌௜ directly, I reconduct this analysis without 
country fixed effects in Section 3.6.4. Table 3.3 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
variables used for these regressions, while Table 3.4 shows the correlations between them. 
Table 3.3: Part 2 Variables, Descriptive Statistics 
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3.5 Results 
In the first part of my analysis I investigate the overall relationship between credit 
markets, financial institutions, and market power on payment tenor – the duration that 
trade credit is provided by the supplier to the buyer. I present the results of this analysis 
in Tables 3.5a, 3.5b, and 3.5c. Table 3.5a displays the results of the regressions that just 
measured credit markets and financial institutions, while Tables 3.5b and 3.5c include my 
two variables (Suppliers and Orders) that try to capture market power. All of these 
regressions include buyer, supplier, and country fixed effects and errors are clustered by 
buyer and country. 
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In Table 3.5a we see that domestic credit supplied by the banking sector (DCBS, 
regression i) and domestic credit supplied to the private sector (DCPS, regression ii) and 
private credit bureau coverage (PCBC, iv) have a statistically significant relationship with 
the payment tenor of a given order. Thicker credit markets were correlated with longer 
payment tenor, while better credit bureau coverage was correlated with shorter payment 
tenor. An increase in domestic credit provided by the banking sector of 10% of GDP 
corresponded to a 1.2 day increase in payment tenor, while an increase in credit provided 
to the private sector by 10% of GDP corresponded to a 1.3 day increase in tenor. In 
contrast, payment tenors in countries with an additional 10% of adults covered by credit 
bureaus were 0.95 days shorter. We also see that the country’s level of development and 
the size of the order affect an order’s payment tenor. A country with a GDP per capita 
that is higher by $1000 was expected to have average payment tenors that were between 
0.6 (regression i) to 0.9 (regression v and vii) days longer. An order that was one million 
dollars larger was paid for roughly 0.4 days more quickly. This is an intuitive result 
because larger orders impose larger working capital requirements on suppliers and hence 
providing trade credit is more costly for these orders.  
All of these results are similar in direction, magnitude, and statistical significance 
in Tables 3.5b and 3.5c as well. In these regressions, thicker domestic credit and a higher 
level of economic development is correlated with longer payment tenors while stronger 
credit bureau coverage and order size are correlated with faster payment terms. In Table 
3.5b we also see that the number of suppliers a buyer has is correlated with an order’s 
payment tenor. In regressions i, ii, and iv we see that a buyer with an additional ten 
buyers will on average have a payment tenor that is 0.3 days faster. At first glance this 
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result would seem to contradict hypothesis 4. However, one explanation of this 
phenomenon is the presence of buyer fixed effects and the fact that this period covers the 
financial crisis. With buyer fixed effects the coefficient on Suppliers is capturing changes 
in the number of suppliers a buyer sources from in a given country. The coefficient 
implies that when a buyer decreased the number of suppliers that he sourced from in a 
given country by 10, his average payment tenor on orders from the country increased by 
0.2 days. If we expect that a buyer that sheds many suppliers in a given country has 
stronger market power with the remaining suppliers, then these coefficients are consistent 
with hypothesis 4. In contrast, in the regressions in Table 3.5c we see that a buyer’s total 
volume of orders does not have a statistically significant relationship with payment tenor 
as none of the coefficients on Orders is significant. 
In the first part of my analysis I thus find evidence that credit markets, financial 
institutions, and market power (as measured by a buyer’s supplier network in a given 
country) impact the length of trade credit terms on orders. However, not all measures of 
credit markets were significant (the level of net domestic credit was not), nor were most 
of the measures of financial institutions. Notably, neither the measure of credit registries, 
credit information depth, nor the Heritage Foundation’s Financial Freedom index had any 
significant relationship with an order’s payment tenor. Interestingly, credit markets and 
financial institutions had an opposite effect on the length of credit extended, with 
financial institutions operating in the opposite direction that I hypothesized. With 
interpretation, market power, as measured by changes in a buyer’s supplier network acts 
as hypothesized, but, surprisingly, we do not see any effect of a buyer’s sourcing volume 
size. 
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3.5.1 The Financial Crisis, Institutions and Market Power 
The second part of my investigation looks at how the payment tenor on orders 
changed as a result of the financial crisis and how this was moderated by the effects of 
credit markets, financial institutions, and market power. The results of this part of my 
investigation are presented in Tables 3.6a, 3.6b, and 3.6c. In Table 3.6a I just look at the 
effect of the crisis and the moderating impact of credit markets and financial institutions 
on payment tenor, while in Tables 3.6b and 3.6c I also include the effects of a buyer’s 
supplier network and total sourcing. All of these regressions include a fixed effect for 
every buyer-supplier-country triad and errors are clustered at the level of the buyer and 
the country. 
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In Table 3.6a I focus on the change in payment tenor depending on whether an 
order was issued before or after the start of the financial crisis (as captured by Post 
Lehman) and the effect on payment tenor of the crisis if the order was issued in a country 
with weak credit markets (Post*Low DCBS, Post* Low DCPC, Post* Low NDC) or 
weak financial institutions (Post*Low PCRC, Post*Low PCBC, Post*Low DCII, 
Post*Low Financial Freedom).55 In most of the regressions (i, ii, iii, vi, and vii), orders 
issued after the financial crisis began had significantly longer payment tenors ranging 
from 0.6 days (regression vii) to 2.2 days (regressions i, ii, and iii). Given that mean 
payment tenor prior to the crisis was 31.1 days, a 2.2 day increase in payment tenor 
corresponds to a 7.1% increase. In contrast, payment tenors for orders issued to suppliers 
in countries with weak credit markets increased much less than for orders in countries 
with strong credit markets. Payment tenors in countries with weak domestic credit from 
the banking sector (Low DCBS) were on average only 1.1 days (2.23-1.17) longer in 
contrast to payment tenors in countries with high DCBS which lengthened by 2.2 days 
(regression i). Identically, payment tenors in countries with weak domestic credit to the 
private sector grew by only 1.1 days as opposed to 2.2 for countries with high DCPS 
(regression ii). The results for countries with weak financial institutions are less clear. 
Payment tenors in countries with low public credit registry coverage (low PCRC) were 
0.9 days longer versus countries with high PCRC where tenors grew by 2.2 days 
(regression iii). However, tenors in countries with weak institutions as measured by 
Financial Freedom increased after the financial crisis to 2.2 days (0.569+1.627) versus 
                                                 
55 Note: The variables indicating whether an order took place in a country with weak 
markets or institutions (e.g. Low DCBS, Low DCPS, etc.) were not included in these 
specifications because they are perfectly collinear with the buyer-supplier-country fixed 
effects. For estimates of these coefficients, please see Section 3.6.4. 
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tenors in countries with high Financial Freedom scores where payment terms grew by 
only 0.6 days (regression vii). Similar to my findings in the first part of this analysis, in 
all of the regressions in Tables 3.6a, 3.6b and 3.6c, larger orders had faster payment 
tenors where an order that was an additional million dollars larger was paid for 0.9 days 
faster. 
In Table 3.6b I look at the role of the size of a buyer’s network in a given country 
on how trade credit terms changed after the crisis. Here I find that, in all regressions, the 
significance of the overall effect of the financial crisis disappears, as does the moderating 
role of the institutions. Instead, the number of suppliers a buyer sourced from before the 
crisis is highly significant. For every additional ten suppliers a buyer sourced from in a 
given country, he could expect average payment tenors of 0.6 to 0.7 days longer. 
Consequently, buyers with larger supplier networks were able to extract substantially 
longer trade credit terms following the financial crisis. I interpret these results to suggest 
that market power, as measured by the size of a supplier’s network, played a substantial 
role in allowing buyers to extend their payment tenors. In contrast, in Table 3.6c we see 
that market power, as measured by the total size of buyer’s order volume had no 
significant relationship with payment tenor. In regressions i through vii, the coefficient on 
the total size of a buyer’s orders after the crisis began (Post*Orders) is not significant. 
However, the average effect of the crisis as measured by the coefficient on Post Lehman, 
and the moderating effects of the credit markets and institutions are identical to those in 
Table 3.6a in terms of significance and direction and similar in magnitude. 
The results of this second part of my analysis are strongly linked to the results in 
the first part. Deep credit markets are linked with longer payment tenors over the entire 
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period and are linked with larger increases in payment tenors after the crisis. Similarly, 
buyers with large supplier networks in the countries they sourced from before the crisis 
were able to get longer payment terms, and buyers that reduced the number of suppliers 
they sourced from also extended their payment terms. Buyer size, as measured by total 
volume of orders was not significant in any of my regressions. Less clear is the role of 
financial institutions. No measure of financial institutions in my sample was significant in 
both the first and second parts of my analysis. Further, the institution that was significant 
in the first part of my analysis, private credit bureau coverage, is a poor measure of 
financial institutions because private credit bureaus do not operate in many countries in 
my sample. Also, in the second stage, the two financial institution measures that were 
significant operated in opposing directions.  
3.6 Robustness 
While the results of my analysis are consistent between the two parts, there are 
many areas of this analysis that could be a cause for concern. Firstly, a discrete dependent 
variable measured in days could provide biased estimates using ordinary least squares 
regression. To alleviate this concern I re-conduct my analysis using negative binomial 
regressions. Secondly, we might be concerned that the creditworthiness of the buyers 
may be impacting my results. Though this should be less of a concern given that I include 
buyer and year fixed effects, I re-conduct my analysis using just the buyers in the sample 
who had publicly available credit ratings. The credit ratings of these buyers did not 
change during this period. Thirdly, the variety of products that buyers sourced changed 
after the financial crisis and thus we might be concerned that different products either 
have systematically different payment terms or might have payment tenors that changed 
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differently as a results of the crisis. To allay this concern I conduct an analysis of how the 
mix of products ordered changed after the crisis and how this was related to trade credit 
terms. Finally, I also re-conduct my analysis without including country fixed effects and 
clustering in order to estimate the coefficients for the non-interacted variables that I used 
in the second part of my analysis. 
3.6.1 Negative Binomial Regression Results 
In Tables 3.7a through 3.7c I reconduct the first part of my analysis using 
negative binomial regressions instead of ordinary least squares. These regressions include 
the same buyer, country, and year fixed effects, but I can only cluster errors at the level of 
the buyer (instead of at the buyer and country level) as tools are not yet available to 
estimate negative binomial regressions with clustered errors at multiple levels. In all of 
my negative binomial regressions I report coefficients as incidence-rate ratios.56 In Table 
3.7a I investigate just the role of institutions and find similar results to Table 3.3a. The 
coefficients on DCBS and DCPS are significant and greater than one which implies that 
more domestic credit increases the rate at which payment tenor days accrue. A ten 
percent increase in either DCBS or DCPS as a share of GDP corresponds to the rate at 
which trade credit terms accrue being increased by a factor of 1.04.57 In contrast the 
coefficient on PCBC is less than one implying that a ten percent increase in PCBC 
coverage decreases the rate at which payment tenor days accrue by a factor of 1.03.58 As 
                                                 
56 A coefficient greater than one implies that an increase in the independent variable 
increases the rate at which the dependent variable accumulates. 
57 1.004^10 
58 (1/0.997)^10 
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before, an increase in GDP per capita is associated with a higher rate of accumulation of 
payment tenor days. 
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As expected, these results also hold true in Tables 3.7b and 3.7c, much as they did 
in Table 3.3b and 3.3c. We also see that the number of suppliers a buyer sources from in 
a given country is negatively associated with the rate at which tenor days accumulate. If a 
buyer sources from ten additional suppliers, the rate at which that order’s tenor length 
increases declined by a factor of 1.01.59 This is similar to the result we found in Table 
3.3b. In Table 3.7c we see that a buyer’s total yearly sourcing volume does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the length of payment tenor, much as we did in Table 
3.3c. 
I next re-conduct the second part of my analysis using negative binomial 
regressions and present my results in Tables 3.8a, 3.8b and 3.8c. The results are identical 
in direction as the results in Tables 3.6a, 3.6b and 3.6c. In Table 3.8a, the fact that an 
order was issued after the crisis implied that it accrued payment tenor days at a faster rate, 
but orders issued in countries with weak capital markets, as measured by DCBS and 
DCPS, and financial institutions, as measured by PCRC, accrued days more slowly after 
the crisis than their counterparts. Orders issued in countries with a low value of Financial 
Freedom increased the rate at which they accumulated tenor days after the crisis. All of 
these results are comparable to my results in Table 3.6a, except that the significance of 
the coefficient on Post Lehman is reduced to the 5% level in regressions i and ii, while 
the significance of the coefficient on Post*Low Financial Freedom is reduced to the 10% 
level.60 The results in Table 3.8b are equally comparable to the results in Table 3.6b 
except that the coefficient on Post*Suppliers loses significance in regressions i-iii, and 
                                                 
59 (1/0.999)^10 
60 This can, in large part, be attributed to the reduction in the number of clusters that 
results from clustering at one, instead of two, levels. 
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the significance of the coefficient on order size falls from the 1% level to the 10% level. 
The results in Table 3.8c are, similarly, comparable to the results in 3.7c, except that the 
coefficient on Post Lehman weakens to the 10% level in regressions i-iii and the 
coefficient on Post*Low Financial weakens to the 10% level in regression vii. Overall, 
the results of estimating my model using negative binomial regression are highly similar 
to my results using ordinary least squares. 
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3.6.2 Buyer Creditworthiness 
Another concern we may have with my results is that the increase in payment 
terms after the financial crisis reflects not the change in market power between the buyer 
and the supplier, but a change in the creditworthiness of the buyer. This is an unlikely 
explanation because, in order for payment terms to have lengthened as we have seen, 
buyer credit worthiness would have had to have improved during the financial crisis, at a 
time when demand had fallen and buyers were cutting back on orders. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to investigate further how buyer creditworthiness evolved during the period in 
my sample. In my sample, seven out of the 22 buyers were public companies, and out of 
these four had debt rated by Standard & Poor’s, ranging from B+ to A+. The ratings of 
these four buyers did not change during the period in my sample. However, one of the 
non-rated, publicly listed firms filed for bankruptcy protection late in the summer of 2008. 
In Figure 3.2  I plot the (non-weighted) average payment terms by month for all orders 
for the firm that filed for bankruptcy protection, just the rated buyers, all of the public 
buyers, and the entire sample. In this graph we see that payment terms for the firm that 
filed for bankruptcy shortened dramatically – to just over five days – as the credit 
worthiness of that firm fell. However, for all other categories, payment terms lengthened, 
even for the rated buyers whose credit ratings did not change over the period.  
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Figure 3.2: Average Payment Terms by Groups of Buyers 
 
 
To ensure that changes in buyer creditworthiness are not driving my results I 
reconduct my analysis using just the four publicly-traded buyers in my sample whose 
debt was rated by the S&P. The debt ratings for all four of these firms did not vary 
throughout the time in my sample and consequently, if the results are similar in this 
sample, we can safely assume that they are not being driven by changes in buyer 
creditworthiness. Overall, I find that my results using this restricted sample are similar in 
direction and broadly similar in significance and magnitude to my results in the full 
sample. 
In Tables 3.9a through 3.9c I reconduct my regressions in Tables 3.3a through 
3.3c except that I limit the sample to these four buyers. With this smaller sample, 
occasionally there was not enough variation by a particular independent variable to get a 
standard error estimate for the coefficient. In all three of these tables we see that deeper 
credit markets as measured by DCBS corresponds to longer payment terms, as do 
stronger financial institutions as measured by public credit registry coverage (PCRC). In 
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constrast stronger financial institutions as measured by private credit bureau coverage 
(PCBC) and Financial Freedom. Unlike in Tables 3.3a through 3.3c, DCPS is not always 
significant because standard error estimates are not available in Tables 3.9a and 3.9b, and 
a country’s net domestic credit (NDC) is significant and positively related to payment 
tenor length which it is not elsewhere in this analysis. Also in contrast to my earlier 
results, the number of suppliers a buyer sources from loses its significance. However, I 
attribute this to the reduction in the number of buyers and the presence of both buyer 
fixed effects and clustering at the buyer (and country) level. 
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When I reconduct the second part of my analysis using just these four buyer, 
again my results, presented in Tables 3.10a through 3.10c, are largely similar to my 
results in Tables 3.6a through 3.6c. The largest difference here is that the moderating 
effect on the lengthening of payment terms disappears because the coefficients on 
Post*Low DCBS and Post*LowDCPS are no longer significant. However, as before 
weak credit registry coverage reduced the degree to which tenor lengthened after the 
crisis began while a low measure of Financial Freedom increased them. However, in this 
sample, both low private credit bureau coverage and a low credit depth of information 
score corresponded to longer payment tenors after the crisis. In terms of market power, 
again, buyers with more suppliers prior to the crisis were able to extract longer payment 
tenors after the crisis. However, in Table 3.10c we also see that, among these four buyers, 
the buyers who increased their sourcing volume the most lengthened their payment tenors 
less than the buyers who did not sourcing volume.  
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3.6.3 Product Mix 
Another concern with my data is that the types of products that buyers were 
sourcing changed during the financial crisis and that these shifts in the product mix might 
be correlated with the changes I find in payment tenor. For example, if buyers started 
sourcing a good that typically has a long payment tenor – and which is only produced in 
countries with strong markets and institutions – more heavily after the crisis, this would 
provide an alternate explanation for why tenor lengthened, and lengthened more in 
countries with stronger institutions. To address this concern, I first identify the categories 
of goods in which sourcing changed substantially before and after the crisis. I then look 
to see whether or not the payment tenor for these goods was significantly different than 
for all other categories. Finally, I check whether the payment tenor for these goods 
changed significantly as a result of the financial crisis. 
To carry out this analysis I first identify which categories of product were ordered 
using the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) codes reported on some orders. 
Unfortunately I am limited to looking at the 117,382 orders in my sample that listed HTS 
information. The breakdown of orders by 2 digit HTS category is reported in Table 3.11. 
Here we see that four categories changed significantly in terms of the share of orders that 
were sourced before and after the crisis. The share of orders in categories 94 (furniture) 
and 33 (cosmetics) declined while the share of orders in 62 (non-knitted or crocheted 
apparel) and 64 (footwear) increased.  
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Table 3.11: Comparison of the Distribution of Orders by Product Category Before 
and After Lehman’s Bankruptcy 
 
 
To see whether this had an impact on my results, I conduct a series of means tests 
to see whether the payment tenors of orders in these categories was significantly different 
than the means of the entire sample of data that contained HTS information. In Table 
3.12a I compare the average payment tenor in each of these four categories with the rest 
of the population and see that only category 62 had an average payment tenor that was 
longer than the rest of the sample. I also compare the average payment tenor of the orders 
in categories 62 and 64 with the payment tenor in categories 33 and 94 and find that the 
tenor in the categories whose orders decreased (the latter) were significantly shorter than 
in the categories which increased (the former). This would suggest that the shift in 
product mix was a significant cause of the lengthening in payment terms that we have 
seen.  
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Table 3.12a: T-test of Payment Tenor Length by 2 Digit HTS Code 
 
However, this analysis does not take into account the fact that different buyers 
source different amounts from each category and that different categories are sourced 
from different countries and in different years. It could be the case that, for example, a 
buyer with particularly long tenors is responsible for most of the ordering in a particular 
category, or that most orders in a particular category are sourced from a country with, on 
average unusually long payment tenors. To correct for this, I subtract the mean payment 
tenor for each buyer-country-year combination from each order’s payment tenor and then 
compare the average payment tenor for each category against the rest of the sample. I 
also compare the de-meaned average payment tenor for the categories that lost share 
versus the categories that gained share. I present the results in Table 3.12b. Here we see 
that neither of the categories that lost share had average payment terms that were 
significantly different from the sample as a whole. Of the categories that gained share, 
Category 62 had tenors that were, on average shorter, and Category 64 had tenors that 
were on average, longer. When I compare the average de-meaned payment tenor for the 
categories that lost share and the categories that gained share, I find that they are not 
statistically different. This analysis, which conducts a more accurate comparison of the 
categories, suggests that the change in product mix is not driving my results. 
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Table 3.12b: T-test of De-Meaned Payment Tenor Length by 2 Digit HTS Code 
 
To investigate this issue further, I also look at how payment terms changed in 
these categories before and after the financial crisis. In Table 3.12c I look at the average 
payment tenor in each category before and after the crisis and see that none of these 
categories had payment terms that were longer after the crisis than before the crisis. I also 
re-conduct this analysis using de-meaned payment tenors (in Table 3.12d) and similarly 
find that none of the tenors increased in these categories. Also only two of the categories, 
94 and 64, had a statistically significant change. While these analyses are not sufficient to 
conclusively prove that changes in product mix do not affect my results, they strongly 
suggest that changes in product mix were, at most, a minor factor. 
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Table 3.12c: T-test of Payment Tenor Length Pre/Post Lehman by 2 Digit HTS 
Code 
 
 
Table 3.12d: T-test of De-Meaned Payment Tenor Length Pre/Post Lehman by 2 
Digit HTS Code 
 
 
3.6.4 Analysis without Country Fixed Effects 
When using fixed effects at the buyer-supplier-country level in my regressions in 
Table 3.6a through 3.6c (and corresponding tables) it was not possible to get coefficient 
estimates on many of the non-interacted independent variables because the variables were 
perfectly collinear with the fixed effects. Consequently, in these tables we could see the 
effect on change in payment tenor of being in a country with weak institutions or credit 
markets before and after the financial crisis. We could not, however, see the overall effect 
of being in a country with these weak institutions or markets in these regressions.61 To 
                                                 
61 We could see the overall effect in Tables 3.3a through 3.3c and related tables. 
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verify that the non-interacted independent variables were also significant in the cases 
where the interacted variables were I reconducted these analyses using just buyer fixed 
effects and clustering errors at the buyer level. The results of these regressions are in 
Tables 3.13a through 3.13c. In almost all cases we see that, when there was a statistically 
significant interaction, the non-interacted independent variable components of that 
interaction were also significant. In Table 3.13a in regressions i-iii, Low DCBS, Low 
DCPS, and Low PCRC were statistically significant on their own as well as when they 
were interacted with Post Lehman. Similarly, in Table 3.13b, the coefficient on Suppliers 
was significant in all regressions except regression ii, in addition to when Suppliers was 
interacted with Post Lehman. The notable exception to this is my Low Financial Freedom 
variable which is not significant on its own but is significant when interacted with Post 
Lehman.  
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Table 3.13a: OLS of Payment Tenor on Pre/Post Lehman and Institutions 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Regressions include buyer fixed effects and errors are clustered by buyer.  
t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 3.13b: OLS of Payment Tenor on Pre/Post Lehman, Institutions and Market 
Power (Suppliers) 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Regressions include buyer fixed effects and errors are clustered by buyer.  
t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Table 3.13c: OLS of Payment Tenor on Pre/Post Lehman, Institutions and Market 
Power (Orders) 
 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Note: Regressions include buyer fixed effects and errors are clustered by buyer.  
t-statistics in parentheses. 
 
   156
3.7 Discussion 
In this chapter I set out to examine the role that credit markets, financial 
institutions, and market power had on trade credit terms because the effect of these 
factors has been poorly understood and insufficiently tested in the existing literature. To 
do this I use a unique set of international contract manufacturing orders that is the first to 
have sufficient country, buyer, and supplier variation to reasonably test the affects that 
credit markets, financial institutions, and market power have. Further, in addition to 
testing how payment tenor varies according to these factors, I also use the financial crisis 
as a quasi-natural experiment that allows me to examine how these factors influence how 
the parties adjusted their trade credit terms. In my analysis I find that credit markets and 
the size of a buyer’s local supplier network substantially affected the trade credit terms on 
an order, and also affected how those terms adjusted in response to the financial crisis. 
Suppliers in countries with deep credit markets offered significantly longer payment 
tenors on their orders, and for orders between a given buyer and supplier in a given 
country payment tenors lengthened substantially when the country had deeper credit 
markets. In the case of market power, a buyer received longer trade credit terms when he 
reduced the number of suppliers he sourced from in a given country, and payment tenors 
lengthened after the financial crisis between a buyer and a supplier in a given country, 
when that buyer had a larger number of suppliers in that country prior to the crisis. In 
contrast to these results, I find that financial institutions, such as those that measure the 
availability of credit information have a less clear impact on payment tenors. My results 
for financial institutions are often weak or contradictory. I also find no significant results 
when market power is measured by the total size of a buyers sourcing volume. 
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This analysis could be extended in several respects. Instead of proxying for a 
supplier’s access to external finance by measuring credit markets, an actual estimate of a 
supplier’s cost of external capital would be preferable. However, given that most of the 
suppliers in my sample were private companies in emerging markets, it is not possible to 
get reliable time series data on cost of capital for a reasonable proportion of these firms. 
Similarly, data on a buyer’s creditworthiness over time would enable us to examine how 
creditworthiness interacts with market power and a supplier’s access to credit markets. In 
this sample, there was no variation in the creditworthiness of the buyers for which public 
information was available. Another way in which this work could be extended is by 
incorporating better measures of market power. The number of suppliers a buyer sources 
from, though a precise metric, would be better when combined with an estimate of local 
competition that is more comprehensive. Estimates of local supplier concentration would 
greatly improve this analysis, but it is questionable whether creating accurate time series 
data of this sort for many, mostly developing, countries is feasible. A very promising 
avenue of future research would be to look at the economic effects on a supplier’s 
performance based on their decision whether or not to extend their trade credit terms. 
Overall, I believe that investigating the factors that affect how firms determine 
their payment tenors is a very important area of future research, because of its large 
economic significance and the fact that its importance will continue to increase as more 
firm activities are outsourced, and increasingly to countries with weak credit markets and 
weak financial institutions.  
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Appendix 
4.1 Variable Contract Enforcement 
The main model in this chapter looks at suppliers in countries where courts either 
enforce contracts stringently enough that a supplier never reneges on a contract (e.g. 
ߙ ൐ ݒሺ݁∗ሻ) or do not enforce contracts at all (ߙ ൌ 0). When courts partially enforce 
contracts, this has the effect of reducing the returns to both parties, and allowing the 
buyer to source from the supplier without having to promise to source from that supplier 
in all future periods, in a larger number of scenarios. Specifically ߙ affects the threshold 
value of the likelihood of future crises ̅ߛ above which the buyer can not pay the supplier 
enough (both because the supplier requires too high of a price and because the buyer has 
an incentive to renege if the price is too high) to ensure that the supplier provides first 
best effort, without promising to source from the supplier in all future periods. This 
threshold value ̅ߛ, including ߙ is: 
̅ߛ ൌ ቌ1 െ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቀ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ െ ݁௅ െ ߙቁ
ቀݒሺ݁∗ሻെ݁∗ െ ௩ሺ௘ಽሻଶ ൅ ߙቁ
ቍ 
Consequently, an increase in ߙ increases ̅ߛ, reducing the range (̅ߛ ൏ ߛ ൏ 1) in 
which the buyer must commit to always sourcing from the supplier. However, the effect 
is continuous and the level of enforcement needed to guarantee that the buyer will never 
need to make a long term promise to always source from the supplier in the weak 
enforcement country (i.e. ̅ߛ=1) is:  
ߙ ൌ ݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅ 
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That is, the penalty for reneging must be at least as large as the supplier’s payoff 
when he reneges in order to ensure that the buyer will never need to commit to always 
sourcing from the supplier in the weak enforcement country.  
4.2 Alternative Payment Scheme 
When ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ, I have shown that a buyer is better off promising to source from ܵௐ 
in all periods and to just source from ௌܵ when there is no crisis. This is because B can not 
credibly offer a high enough price to ܵௐ in a single period to prevent him from reneging, 
without also promising to always source from him. An alternative arrangement is for B to 
propose a payment scheme whereby he pays ܵௐ a price ݌ఊ in periods where there is a 
crisis – but does not source any product from ܵௐ – and ݌଴ when there is no crisis – and 
he does source product from ܵௐ. At the same time B would source the good from ௌܵ in all 
periods. 
In order for this price scheme to be high enough that it deters ܵௐ from reneging in 
a period where demand is high, it must be the case that his return from reneging cannot 
be higher than his discounted future payoff, i.e.: 
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ ൑෍ߚ
௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ݌଴ െ ݁ሻ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
൅෍ߚ௧ߛ݌ఊ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
 
Since B will want to minimize the expected amount he will pay ܵௐ – and will 
want ܵௐ to provide the effort ݁∗ that will maximize his surplus – he will choose the 
lowest ݌଴ and ݌ఊ such that ܵௐ is indifferent between reneging and complying, i.e. 
ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ ൌ෍ߚ
௧ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ݌଴ െ ݁∗ሻ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
൅෍ߚ௧ߛ݌ఊ
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
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ݒሺ݁௅ሻ
2 െ ݁௅ ൌ
ሺ1 െ ߛሻ
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺ݌଴ െ ݁
∗ሻ ൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߚሻ ݌ఊ			ሼ8ሽ 
Now let us consider the payoff that B expects to get by using this payment scheme. 
Under this scheme he always sources from ௌܵ getting an expected net payoff of 
∑ ߚ௧ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻஶ௧ୀ଴ . When there is no crisis he also sources from ܵௐ getting 
∑ ߚ௧ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݌଴ሻஶ௧ୀ଴ , but when there is a crisis he must also pay ܵௐ ∑ ߚ௧݌ఊஶ௧ୀ଴ . Thus, 
B’s expected net payoff for using this alternate scheme is: ∑ ߚ௧ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻஶ௧ୀ଴ ൅ ሺ1 െ
ߛሻ∑ ߚ௧ሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݌଴ሻஶ௧ୀ଴ ൅ ߛ ∑ ߚ௧݌ఊஶ௧ୀ଴  
1
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݌଴ሻ ൅ ߛሺ1 െ ߚሻ ݌ఊ			ሼ9ሽ 
We can substitute {8} into {9} which gives us: 
1
ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ െ ൬ݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅൰ 
However, this expected net payoff is identical to that of always sourcing from ܵௐ 
and just sourcing from ௌܵ when there is no crisis. That payoff, from {3}, is: 
෍ߚ௧ ൭ݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ െ ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ቆݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅ቇ൱
ஶ
௧ୀ଴
൅෍ߚ௧
ஶ
௧ୀଵ
ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺݒሺ݁∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ
ൌ 1ሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߛሻሺ1 െ ߚሻ ሺݒሺ݁
∗ሻ െ ݁∗ሻ െ ൬ݒሺ݁௅ሻ2 െ ݁௅൰ 
Consequently, this alternative payment scheme, where ܵௐ is paid during times of 
crisis, but not required to produce any goods, is no better for the B, than choosing to 
source from ܵௐ in all periods.62 
                                                 
62 There are also a variety of organizational behavior factors (not modeled) that would 
make it less efficient to use such a payment scheme and in interviews with supply chain 
professionals involved in the footwear and sportswear industries, no person reported 
having heard of such a payment scheme. 
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4.3 When Suppliers in Strong Enforcement Countries have Lower Costs 
I now consider the case where the efficient supplier is in Strong ( ௌܵ௘), and the 
inefficient supplier is in Weak (ܵௐ௜ ). In the context of my data this is the less plausible 
case as, in labor intensive industries, costs of production are almost invariably positively 
correlated with stronger institutions. Here the efficient supplier, ௌܵ௘, never reneges on a 
contract and therefore B can make him a take it or leave it offer such that B pays a price 
just equal to his cost. As before, B will demand the level of effort that maximizes his 
value, ݁∗, but now he only needs to pay a fraction of the price, i.e. ݌ ൌ ௘ఏ
∗
, since ௌܵ௘’s 
costs are lower. Sourcing from ܵௐ௜  remains unchanged from the base case, and 
consequently, the threshold ̅ߛ, remain unchanged. 
In this context it never makes sense to source from ܵௐ௜  and not ௌܵ௘ because if B 
sources from ܵௐ௜  and not ௌܵ௘, ܵௐ௜  has an incentive to subcontract production to ௌܵ௘ who is 
willing to produce the unit for a price below ܵௐ௜ ’s costs. Consequently, B is always at 
least as well off sourcing from ௌܵ௘ as from ܵௐ௜ .63 Therefore, B always sources from ௌܵ௘ and 
only sources from ܵௐ௜  in periods where there is no crisis. The price that B must pay ܵௐ௜  
and the effort that ܵௐ௜  provides depends on the risk of crisis ߛ. If ߛ ൑ ̅ߛ, then B will, as 
before, be able to use relational contracting without making a long term commitment and 
pay price ݌ ൌ ሺଵିఉሻሺଵିఊሻ ቀ
௩ሺ௘ಽሻ
ଶ െ ݁௅ቁ ൅ ݁∗ for effort ݁ ൌ ݁∗. If ߛ ൐ ̅ߛ then relational 
                                                 
63 Note: This result only holds because I have not assumed any transportation costs. If it 
is the case that the cost of transportation between ܵௐ௜  and ௌܵ௘ exceeds the difference in 
efficiency between ܵௐ௜  and ௌܵ௘ then there are parameter values for which it is optimal for 
B to make a long term commitment to ܵௐ௜ . 
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contracting in just non-crisis periods breaks down and B can only elicit effort ݁ ൌ ݁௅. In 
neither case can B improve performance by making a long term commitment to ܵௐ௜  or ௌܵ௘.  
Thus, in this context, where the supplier in Strong is more efficient (i.e. has lower 
costs) than the supplier in Weak, long term commitments do not help the buyer source 
more effectively from either supplier. Consequently, since long term commitments are 
not used there is no tradeoff in flexibility that arises from the use of relational contracting.  
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